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ADDING A LITTLE GOLD TO THE GOLDEN YEARS: SHOULD
THE EUROPEAN UNION PROHIBIT COMPULSORY
RETIREMENT AS AGE-BASED DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT?
ProfessorRoger J Goebel
Abstract
On October 2, 1997, the Member States of the European Union
signed the Treaty of Amsterdam which amended the European
Community Treaty (ECT). Among the Amsterdam Treaty's most
importantnew provisionswas ECTArticle 13, which authorizedthe
Council of Ministers, acting unanimously, to "take appropriate
action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic
origin, religion or belief disability, age or sexual orientation."The
Council acted with surprisingrapidity to adopt Directive 2000/78,
which prohibits discriminationin employment on all the listed bases
(exceptfor "racialor ethnic origin, " which is covered by Directive
2000/43).
Since December 2, 2003, the end of the periodfor Member State
implementation ofDirective 2000/78, the Court ofJustice has issued
numerous judgments interpreting and applying the Directive s
provisions. By far the largestnumber have concerned the Directive s
prohibition of discriminationin employment based on age. To date
there has been relatively little American (or indeed EU) academic
commentary upon the Court's judgments.
This article is accordingly timely in its presentation of the terms of
Directive 2000/78, and its critical examination of the Court
judgments concerning the prohibition of discrimination in
employment based on age. Moreover the article compares the
impact of the Directive and the Courtjudgmentswith the prohibition
of discrimination in employment based on age through the U.S. Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), initially adopted in
1969. As amended in 1984, the ADEA totally prohibits employers
from setting a compulsory retirement date, except where advanced
age tends to impair an employee s occupational qualifications
essentialforperformance in a particularprofession or job.
In Part I, the article describes the operational provisions of
Directive 2000/78 relevant to the prohibition of age-based
discrimination. The principalfocus of the article, in Part II, is a
description and critical examination of the four Court judgments
reviewing national rules that authorize employers to set an age
(usually sixty-five) for the compulsory retirement ofemployees. Part
III supplements this with a description and critical examination of
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nationalcompulsory retirementrulesfor certain specificprofessions
or occupations (e.g., airline pilots, policemen, firemen, judges,
prosecutors).
Because the Court of Justice's judgments have held that national
rules authorizing employers to set a compulsory retirement age do
not violate Directive 2000/78, a natural question is whether this
judicial conclusion can be considered to be appropriate, as
compared to the total prohibition of compulsory retirement in the
U.S. After considering the significantdifference between the limited
social impactof the prohibition ofcompulsory retirementin the U.S.,
as contrasted with the significant adverse social impact of
prohibitingcompulsory retirement in many EU Member States, the
article concludes that substantially higher unemployment rates
among young people under thirty in some EU States justify their
governments' rules that authorize employers to set a compulsory
retirement age. Accordingly, the Court's judgments that permit
national rules to authorize compulsory retirement in order to open
employment opportunitiesfor younger workers can be evaluated as
appropriateandjustified.
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INTRODUCTION
Discrimination in employment based on age may conceivably affect everyone at
one stage or another in their lives. In contrast, discrimination based on other factors,
e.g., race, sex, religion, disability, or sexual orientation, only affects certain
individuals, even if the discrimination is pervasive and seriously reprehensible. Most
Americans are accustomed to a social lifestyle in which most people choose
voluntarily to retire in their early sixties, or a few years later when eligible for full
social security retirement benefits. However, some Americans prefer to continue their
usual employment or occupation, or commence a new one, in their late sixties,
seventies, or even eighties. This is regarded as quite normal, a feature of the modem
American lifestyle. Fortunately, Congress has provided solid protection for older
Americans who want to continue in their employment or occupation through its virtual
elimination of compulsory retirement in 1986.
Congress commenced its protection of employees above the age of 40 from agebased discrimination through provisions of its Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967 (1967 ADEA), which generally forbid age-based discriminatory practices in
employment, up to the age of sixty-five. This effectively included the prohibition of
compulsory retirement prior to sixty-five. Subsequently in 1978, Congress amended
the ADEA (1978 ADEA) to prohibit age-based discrimination in employment prior to
the age of seventy, which implicitly prohibited compulsory retirement prior to that
2
age. In 1986, Congress significantly amended the ADEA (1986 ADEA) to eliminate
Alpin J. Cameron Professor of Law, Fordham Law School. In the interest of full disclosure, I should
indicate that I am eighty years old. I am grateful to Alison Shea, Fordham's librarian specialist in European
Union law, for her invaluable research assistance.
1Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967)
(codified with later amendments in 29 U.S.C. § § 621-34 (2016)). Section 4 ofthe 1967 ADEA Public Law
prohibited numerous types of age-based discrimination (e.g., in hiring, discharge, compensation, terms or
conditions of employment), but § 12 ended the prohibition at age 65, thus permitting employers to compel
employees to retire at that age. Also, § 4(f) (now 29 U.S.C. § 632) permitted employers to adopt
discriminatory policies or take discriminatory action based upon an employee's age when "age is a bona
fide occupational requirement necessary to the normal operation of the particular business."
2The 1967 ADEA was amended on Apr. 6, 1978 by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189 (1978), which extended the ADEA's prohibition of
age discrimination until age seventy, instead of sixty-five. The 1978 ADEA added an exception that
authorized employers to compel senior management exercising a policymaking role to retire at sixty-five.
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the compulsory retirement of employees at an employer-set, prescribed age, with one
significant exception: termination based upon an employee's age when "age is a bona
fide occupational qualification" 3 (BFOQ).
In contrast, in the European Union discrimination in employment based on age
became a concern relatively recently. The Council of Ministers took legislative action
to prohibit such discrimination through Council Directive 2000/784 establishing a
general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, adopted on
November 27, 2000, and in effect since December 2, 2003. Subsequently, over twenty
EU Court of Justice judgments have interpreted and applied Directive 2000/78's
prohibition of discrimination in employment based on age in a variety of contexts.
In striking contrast to the American scene, compulsory retirement of employees
is both common and generally considered to be appropriate in the EU. Why some
Member State governments authorize or endorse compulsory retirement, and why the
Court of Justice has interpreted Directive 2000/78's provisions to permit this, is little
known in the United States. The present Article is accordingly timely, both through its
description of the legal status of compulsory retirement in the EU, and in its
consideration of the substantially different social and economic circumstances of the
EU and the United States that may justify these different policies.
Part I of this Article describes the Treaty basis for antidiscrimination legislation,
and then review and analyze the operational provisions of Council Directive 2000/78.
Such discrimination has its greatest impact when employers terminate the employment
of older persons solely based on age, especially if legislative or regulatory acts of
Member States authorize employer-set standard retirement ages in all forms of
employment.
Accordingly, the most important topic in this Article is discussed in Part II, which
reviews four Court of Justice judgments examining governmental authorization for
employer-set standard retirement ages in all forms of employment, in order to
determine whether this is consonant with the Directive. Part II also critically appraises

Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, 100 Stat. 3342
(1986), effective January 1, 1987, generally forbid employers to require the mandatory retirement of an
employee at any age. The 1986 ADEA amendment retained the exception for age-based discrimination
based on bona fide occupational qualifications for the particular employment field or position. The 1986
amendment also provided an exception that enabled states and local governments to require mandatory
retirement at fifty-five for two specific professions: firefighters and law enforcement officers. See the
coverage of these two exceptions infra Part III.C.
4 Council Directive 2000/78/EC, Establishing a General Framework for Equal Treatment in
Employment and Occupation, 2000 0.J. (L 303) 16.
A directive is a form of legislation that is unique to the European Union, as a means of achieving
legally binding rules in all of the EU's Member States while still providing each State with considerable
discretion in applying the rules. Article 189 of the initial European Economic Community Treaty (EEC
Treaty) stated that a directive was binding on any State to which it is addressed, but "shall leave to the
national authorities the choice of form and methods." See the Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community, art. 128, Mar. 25, 1957, and effective Jan. 1, 1958. This text was never changed in later Treaties
and now appears in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 288, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J.
(C 326) 1 [hereinafter TFEU], which is annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European
Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 [hereinafter
Treaty of Lisbon]. For a description of directives, see DAVID EDWARD & ROBERT LANE, EDWARD & LANE
ON EUROPEAN UNION LAW, § 6.63-6.66 (2013).
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each of the Court judgments.
Part II.D reviews the evolution in American law from the initial 1967 ADEA to
the 1986 amendment that virtually eliminated compulsory retirement. This enables an
examination of the policy reasons for the Court of Justice's acceptance of national
standard compulsory retirement ages, in contrast to the policy motivations for the
ADEA's virtual elimination of compulsory retirement. Part II.D's conclusion is that
significantly different legal, social, and economic circumstances in the EU and the
United States justify their different policies.
The key pragmatic factor justifying the EU's policy approach is socioeconomic:
all of the leading Court precedents have concluded that Member State governments
may appropriately promote an "inter-generational balance" between the interests of
younger, mid-career, and older employees when determining whether to adopt or
endorse a compulsory retirement age. This is partly due to the fact that some Member
States currently have, or have had, unusually high levels of unemployment of young
people under twenty-five, which tends to motivate governments to endorse the
compulsory retirement of older workers, or to set other limits on employment based
on age.
Part II.E contains some reflections concerning the impact of future demographic
developments. In general, neither the Member State governments, nor the Court of
Justice have paid much attention to the future demographic evolution, particularly the
steadily growing percentage of older persons in the total population. To the extent that
older persons are no longer employed, or self-employed, they are unlikely to provide
revenues through income taxation and are apt to be increasingly dependent on state
old-age pensions or other social benefits. In view of longer life expectancies, this is
certain to pose serious economic problems for governments. Part II.E concludes by
urging that governments that currently endorse or authorize a standard retirement age
set at sixty-five or sixty-seven should seriously consider moving it to seventy, as the
U.S. Congress did in 1978, and perhaps later eliminating altogether an endorsement
of a compulsory retirement age.
Related to the principal topic examined in Part II is a second one: whether
Directive 2000/78's provisions should permit Member State rules that set or endorse
employer-set retirement ages, or other age-based limits, for various professions and
fields of employment. Part III examines this topic. Part III.A and B analyzes several
relevant Court judgments and critically appraises them. Part III.C compares the Court
case-law with pertinent U.S. court judgments that evaluated whether employer-set
retirement ages for specific professions or fields of employment could be justified as
bona-fide occupational qualification requirements under the ADEA, or under other
ADEA exceptions. This enables some interesting parallels and contrasts.
For the sake of concision, this Article will not cover Court judgments concerning
discrimination based upon age in employee pay, benefits or other work conditions.
Two final observations are due. First, the Court of Justice judgments examined in
this Article have usually provided great deference to the EU Member State rules that
endorsed compulsory retirement due to age in all forms of employment, as well as
compulsory retirement or other age-based limits in specific professions or fields of
employment. Whether such judicial deference is justified, or excessive certainly
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requires critical examination. The Court's view that governments should legitimately
be able to craft rules aimed at achieving an inter-generational balance in the workforce
may well be valid in principle, but not necessarily appropriate in certain contexts.
Second, customary stereotypes concerning the allegedly inevitable deterioration of
mental and physical capacity of older people have tended to justify governments'
acceptance of employer-imposed limits on employment based on age, especially in
regard to specific professions or fields of work.
Viewed as an ensemble, Directive 2000/78 and the Court judgments that have
interpreted and applied its provisions have been beneficial to many employees.
Nonetheless, as we shall see, whether EU Member State rules regarding compulsory
retirement, and Court judgments assessing them, appropriately represent desirable
social policy is sometimes questionable, especially when contrasted with those in the
United States.
I. COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2000/78 ON A GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR
EQUAL TREATMENT IN EMPLOYMENT AND OCCUPATION
A. The Treaty Basisfor AntidiscriminationLegislation
As is common in the history of the European Union, the story of the effort to
protect employees from discrimination based on age began with an initiative of the
Commission, the EU's central administrative body. On July 7, 1994, the Commission
Directorate-General on Social Policy and Employment, 6 headed by the Irish
Commissioner Padraig Flynn, issued a White Paper on European Social Policy,
setting out a comprehensive program of proposed legislation and other action in the
employment sector. The White Paper included a little-noticed paragraph near the end
of the text which declared that "the Commission ... believes that, at the next
opportunity to revise the Treaties, serious consideration must be given to the
introduction of a specific reference to combating discrimination on the grounds of
race, religion, age, and disability." 8
The Irish government clearly viewed Commissioner Flynn's suggestion
favorably, because during the Irish government's Presidency 9 of the European
6Since the Commission's creation in 1958, it has operated through administrative
divisions called
Directorates-General, each headed by a Director-General under the supervision of a Commissioner. See
DESMOND DINAN, EUROPE RECAST-A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN UNION 89 (2nd ed., 2014). In each
successive Commission, around twenty to twenty-five Directorates-general are designated, adopting policy
decisions and proposing legislation in each one's sector. See David Spence, The Directorates-Generaland

the Services: Structures, Functions and Procedures, in THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 128-55 (David

Spence ed., 2006).
Commissioner Flynn not only headed the Social Policy and Employment Directorate-General in the
last Commission under the Presidency of Jacques Delors (1993-94), but continued as its Director-General
in the Commission under President Jacques Santer (1995-99).
Commission White Paperon European Social Policy-A Way Forwardfor the Union, Part VI

T 27,

COM (1994) 333 final (July 27, 1994). The term, "White Paper," borrowed from English administrative
terminology, indicates a Commission document outlining a policy program. The White Paper's legislative
proposals included measures to promote worker health and safety, information and consultation of workers,
and the protection of temporary and part-time workers. All were subsequently adopted as directives.
9 The European Council is composed of the Prime Ministers of all the Member States (except for

2017]

ADDING A LITTLE GOLD TO THE GOLDEN YEARS

311

Council, it prepared the initial text of proposed Treaty amendments in a December
1996 Dublin draft, 10 which included text enabling the Council of Ministers to
authorize anti-discrimination measures. Nonetheless, the text's inclusion in the
proposed Treaty amendments was not guaranteed, because the Conservative UK
government of Prime Minister John Major was likely to oppose it. After the Labour
party won the UK's May 1997 election, Tony Blair became the Prime Minister. Then
the Socialist Lionel Jospin became Prime Minister of France in June 1997, replacing
a conservative government. These two Prime Ministers joined with Chancellor Helmut
Kohl of Germany and other liberal and socialist leaders to advance the proposal of a
general anti-discrimination provision in the Treaty.
After the successful conclusion of the Intergovernmental Conference in
Amsterdam in July 1997, the Member States signed the Treaty of Amsterdam, which
became effective May 1, 1999. 11 The new Treaty introduced Article 13 into the
European Community Treaty (ECT), authorizing the Council "acting unanimously on
a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament [to]
take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin,
12
religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation."
The introduction of ECT Article 13 did not, however, ensure that the Council of
Ministers would adopt effective legislative measures to prohibit various forms of

France, which sends both its President and its Prime Minister to European Council meetings), together with
the President of the Commission as a non-voting member. In contrast to the traditional political institutions
of the EU, the role and operations of the European Council are still not well understood today. For a useful
description, see Roger J. Goebel, The European CouncilAfter the Treaty ofLisbon, 34 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
1251 (2011). Treaty on European Union, art. 15, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 1 [hereinafter TEU], as
amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, describes the European Council's basic role as defining the EU's "general
political directions and priorities," and provides that it shall elect a President for one or two successive two
and a half year terms. Prior to the Lisbon TEU, the Presidency of the European Council rotated among
Member State governments on a semi-annual basis. For an authoritative description of the background,
structure and most significant provisions of the Lisbon Treaty, see JEAN-CLAUDE PIRIS, THE LISBON
TREATY: A LEGAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS (2010). For an overview, see DINAN, supra note 6, at 30516.
For a description of the other E.U. political and judicial institutions, namely, the European Parliament,
the Council of Ministers, the Commission, and the Court of Justice, see THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION (John Peterson & Michael Shackleton eds., 3rd ed. 2012); Edward & Lane, supra note
5, ch. 3, 5; TREvOR C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW ch. 1, 2 (7th ed. 2010).
More summary descriptions are in ROGER J. GOEBEL ET AL., EUROPEAN UNION LAW ch. 2 (4th ed. 2015)
and ALAN DASHWOOD, ET AL., WYATT & DASHWOOD'S EUROPEAN UNION LAW ch. 3 (6th ed. 2011).
10

Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, A General Outlinefor

a DraftRevision ofthe Treaties, REF CONF 2500/96 COR I (Dec. 5, 1996).
" The Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the
European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of
Amsterdam], signed Oct. 2, 1997, effective May 1, 1999, amended the Maastricht Treaty Establishing the
European Community, Jul. 29, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) [hereinafter ECT]. The Treaty of Amsterdam
renumbered most of the ECT articles.
12 ECT, art. 13(1). Article 13(2) authorized the Council of Ministers and the Parliament to adopt
"incentive measures," through their now customary cooperative legislative process known as the "ordinary
legislative procedure." In this complex legislative procedure, the Commission proposes an initial legislative
text, which the Council and Parliament separately review (and usually amend), before ultimately jointly
adopting the legislation. For a recent description of the "ordinary legislative procedure," see GOEBEL ET
AL., supra note 9, at 160-62; HARTLEY, supra note 9, at 36-39.
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discrimination, because the Council was obliged to act unanimously.1 3 Accordingly, in
July 2000 the Council adopted Directive 2000/43 implementing the principal of equal
treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin.14 Action to combat
discrimination in employment based on sex was essentially superfluous, in view of the
beneficial impact of the well-known Council Directive 76/207 on equal treatment for
men and women in employment and working conditions,15 adopted on February 9,
1976. In contrast, only some Member States had legislation prohibiting discrimination
based on "disability, age or sexual orientation," so that Council unanimity on
legislation with regard to them was by no means assured. The newly-installed
Commission headed by President Romano Prodi (1999-2004) proposed in October
1999 legislation based on ECT Article 13,16 together with an action program intended
to supplement the legislation with 'best practices,' and then proposed a revised
directive text on June 27, 2000.
Acting with surprising rapidity, on November 27, 2000 the Council managed to
achieve unanimity to adopt Directive 2000/78 establishing a general framework for
equal treatment in employment and occupation to combat "discrimination on the
grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation as regards
employment and occupation."' Immediately worth emphasis is that Council Directive
2000/78's scope is limited to employment and occupation, in contrast to Council
Directive 2000/43, which prohibits discrimination based on "racial or ethnic origin"
whenever the EC Treaty is applicable (for example, whenever EC or EU rules apply
in healthcare, education, or access to or supply of goods and services).
Since December 2, 2003, the end of the initial period within which the Member
States were obligated to adopt legislation or other rules in order to implement
Directive 2000/78, the Court of Justice has had occasion to issue many judgments
interpreting and applying the Directive. In order to keep this Article within reasonable
parameters, this Article will deal solely with judgments concerning discrimination
based on age-by far the most numerous type and the subject of a substantial body of
academic commentary.19

1" The requirement that the Council act unanimously certainly posed no barrier to measures to combat
discrimination based on "racial or ethnic origin," because all Member States already had constitutional
provisions and/or legislation intended to achieve this.
14 Council Directive 2000/43/EC, Implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment Between Persons
Irrespective of Racial or Ethnic Origin, 2000 0.J. (L 80) 22.
15 Council Directive 76/207/EEC, On the Implementation of the Principle
of Equal Treatment for Men

and Women, 1976 O.J. (L 39) 40.
16

Commission Communication to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic
and Social

Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Certain Community Measures to Combat Discrimination,

COM (1999) 564 final (Nov. 25, 1999). The Commission issued a revised proposal for Council Directive
2000/78 on June 27, 2000. Commission Proposalfor a Council Directive Establishing a General
Frameworkfor Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation, COM (2000) 42 final (June 27, 2000).
17 Council Directive 2000/78, supra note 4. P. WATSON, E.U. SOCIAL AND EMPLOYMENT LAW ch. 29
(2nd ed. 2014) provides a summary review of the Directive's provisions.
1 Council Directive 2000/78, supra note 4, art. 1.
19

Helen Meehan, Age Discriminationin the E. U. and the FrameworkDirective, in THE LAW ON AGE

DISCRIMINATION IN THE E.U. 9 (Malcolm Sargeant ed., 2008) [hereinafter Meehan, Age Discrimination]
provides a valuable review of the Directive. The Directive's implementation (and prior law) in Finland,
France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom is discussed in other
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One further introductory point: the Treaty of Amsterdam preceded the June 1999
decision of the European Council at Cologne20 to call for the drafting of a human rights
charter, as well as the subsequent October 1999 decision of the European Council at
Tampere, Finland,2 1 to authorize a special Convention to draft the Charter. The
Convention was composed of representatives of the Member State governments, the
Commission, the European Parliament, and national parliaments. The former
President of Germany, Roman Herzog, served as its Chairman. The special
Convention's drafting of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union22
during 1999-2000 coincided with the Council of Ministers' consideration of Directive
2000/78.
Although the Charter achieved moral influence through its formal proclamation
by the Presidents of the Parliament, Council, and Commission at Nice in December
2001, it did not have immediate legal force. Until the Lisbon Treaty on European
Union (the Lisbon TEU) asserted in Article 6(1) that the Charter "shall have the same
legal value as the Treaties," 23 Court judgments interpreting Directive 2000/78 were
not obligated to refer to the Charter, although they occasionally did so.
Since November 1, 2009, the effective date of the Lisbon TEU, Court judgments
concerning Directive 2000/78 do sometimes refer to the Charter's Article 21 on Non24
Discrimination, which sets out a long list of prohibited bases of discrimination.
However, the Charter's listing of "age" as a prohibited basis of discrimination does
not appear to have had any decisive impact on the Court judgments, although it has
25
buttressed the Court's conclusions in particular cases. The Charter also contains

chapters of THE LAW ON AGE DISCRIMINATION IN THE E.U. (Malcolm Sargeant ed., 2008). Valuable articles
include: Elaine Dewhurst, The Development of E. U Case-Law on Age Discrimination on Employment:
'Will You Still Need Me? Will You Still Feed Me? When I'm Seventy-four' 19 EUR.L.J. 517 (2013); Elaine
Dewhurst, IntergenerationalBalance, MandatoryRetirement and Age Discriminationin Europe: How can
the ECJ Better Support National Courts in Finding a Balance Between the Generations?, 50 COMMON

MKT. L. REV. 1333 (2013) [hereinafter Dewhurst, IntergenerationalBalance]; Helen Meehan, Reflecting
on Age Discrimination and Rights of the Elderly in the European Union and the Council of Europe, 14

MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & Comp. L. 39 (2007); Elise Muir, OfAges In-and Edges of-E.U. Law, 48 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 39 (2011); Dagmar Schiek, Age DiscriminationBefore the ECJ- Conceptual and Theoretical
Issues, 48 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 777 (2011); Lisa Waddington, Comment, Palacios de la Villa, 45
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 895 (2008); Philippa Watson, Equality Between Europe s Citizens: Where Does The
Union Now Stand?, 35 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1 (2012).
20 The June 1999 European Council, chaired by Germany's Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, specified
that the Charter should consolidate the "fundamental rights applicable at the Union level." EUROPEAN
COMMISSION, Bulletin of the European Union, No. 6/10, at 13 (1999).
21 The October 1999 European Council, chaired by Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen of Finland, set the
composition of the special drafting Convention. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Bulletin of the European Union,
No. 10/10, at 7 (1999).
22 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 391
[hereinafter Charter]. Grainne de Burca, The Drafting of the European Union Charter of Fundamental
Rights, 26 EUR. L. REV. 126 (2001) provides a valuable study of the drafting process. For a current, detailed
examination of the Charter's role and its provisions, see THE CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: A
COMMENTARY (Steve Peers et al. eds., 2014).
23 Treaty of Lisbon, art. 6(1).
24 Charter, art. 21 on non-discrimination supplements the list of prohibited bases of discrimination
in
Directive 2000/78 (e.g., adding "colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language,... members of a
national minority"), but does not add to the identification of "age" as a prohibited base of discrimination.
25 See Charter, art. 21.
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Article 25, The Rights of the Elderly, which states that the EU "respects the rights of
the elderly to lead a life of dignity and independence," but this has not appeared to
26
influence any of the relevant Court judgments.
Finally, it should be noted that the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon's accessory Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 2 7 has replaced ECT Article 13 with a
new Article 19. TFEU Article 19 has retained ECT Article 13's list of the types of
discrimination prohibited. However, TFEU Article 19 has modified the mode of
legislative action. The Council must continue to act unanimously, but since Nov. 1,
2009, the Parliament shares in the process of adopting legislation because it must
28
provide its consent to any Council measure. To date, TFEU Article 19 has not been
employed to adopt any modification to Directive 2000/78.
B. The OperationalProvisions of the Council Directive 2000/78
The basic provisions of Council Directive 2000/78 are clearly based on analogous
text in the well-known Council Directive 76/207 on equal treatment for men and
women in employment and working conditions,2 9 setting out provisions that were
easily carried over from a sex-discrimination context to other bases of employment
discrimination. However, experience since 1976, buttressed by relevant Court
judgments, showed the need for the more precise text and supplementary provisions
of Directive 2000/78. The Directive's title, "a general framework for equal treatment
in employment and occupation," indicates that it is not intended to cover the field
comprehensively, as some directives do, but is intended to provide the basic structure
for Member State implementing legislation. The following description of the
directive's provisions concentrates on those relevant to discrimination based on age,
rather than other factors.
As is customary, Directive 2000/78 commences with a list of thirty-seven recitals,
which often provide the motivation for Directive provisions, or facilitate the
interpretation of Directive articles .30 Immediately worthy of note are Recital 6, which
cites the 1989 European Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of
Workers as recognizing "the need to take appropriate action for the social and
economic integration of elderly and disabled people,"31 and Recital 8, which cites the
December 1999 Helsinki European Council Employment Guidelines for 2000, which
had stated "the need to pay particular attention to supporting ... older workers, in order
32
to increase their participation in the labour force."

26 See Charter, art.
25.
27 The TFEU, annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon, amends and replaces the Treaty of Amsterdam's
ECT.
28 TFEU, art. 19(1). TFEU, art. 289(2) authorizes a "special legislative procedure" for the joint
adoption of certain EU legislative acts by the Council and the Parliament, instead of the usual "ordinary
legislative procedure." Frequently a "special legislative procedure" set in a specific TFEU provision
requires the Council to act unanimously. When the Parliament must give its consent, the Parliament may
approve or veto the Council measure, but it cannot amend it.
29 Council Directive 2000/43, supra note 14; Council Directive 76/207, supra note 15.
3o Council Directive 2000/78, supra note 4.
31

Id. rec. 6.

32 Id. rec. 8. See Council Decision 2000/228/EC, On Guidelines for Member States' Employment

Policies for the Year 2000, 2000 0.J. (L 72) 15.
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Note that in addition to this European Council recommendation, the Commission
has frequently issued studies and recommendations urging action to promote
Particularly pertinent is the Commission
employment for older workers.
Communication, "Increasing the Employment of Older Workers and Delaying the Exit
from the Labour Market," 3 4 issued in 2004. The Commission essentially urged that
government policies should encourage older workers to continue working, especially
in view of longer life expectancies, in order to sustain economic growth, to provide
tax revenues, and to reduce the burden on state old-age pensions.
Article 1 on the Directive's purpose states that it is intended to establish a "general
framework for combatting discrimination" on any of the bases of discrimination listed
in ECT Article 13 (other than sex and racial or ethnic origin, already covered in
Council Directives 76/207 and 2000/43). 35 Noteworthy is that both the title of
Directive 2000/78 and its Article 1 indicate that its scope includes "employment and
occupation." The inclusion of "occupation" means that self-employed persons in
professional or technical fields (e.g., doctors and other medical professionals,
accountants, architects, engineers, lawyers) are encompassed by the Directive's
provisions.
Article 2 on the concept of discrimination has great importance. Article 2(a)
prohibits direct discrimination (discrimination between persons in a comparable
situation). This is supplemented by Article 2(b), which prohibits indirect
discrimination, defined as "where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or
practice" would place persons having a "particular age" (or other basis of
discrimination) "at a particular disadvantage." 3 6 The Directive's definition of indirect
discrimination is essentially based on Court judgments applying the concept in sex
discrimination judgments. Article 2(b) immediately enables an exception from
prohibition for a "provision, criterion or practice.. .objectively justified by a legitimate
aim" achieved in an "appropriate and necessary" fashion. Article 2(b)(5) specifically
authorizes "measures [necessary] in a democratic society... for public security, for the
maintenance of public order... [and] for the protection of health....38
Article 3 indicates that the Directive encompasses "both the public and the private
sectors," so that both civil service and private sector employment are covered. Article
3 then provides a valuable list of conditions and circumstances covered by the
Directive, several of which have already been the subject of recent Court judgments
on the prohibition of age discrimination in specific professions or fields of
employment, reviewed in Part III. The list includes "conditions for access to
employment, to self-employment or to occupation," as well as "employment and

" For pertinent Commission studies and reports, see Meehan, Age Discrimination,supra note 19, at
15-17; Dewhurst, IntergenerationalBalance, supra note 19, at 1338-42.
3 Commission Communication on Increasing the Employment of Older Workers and Delaying the

Exit from the LabourMarket, COM (2004) 146 final (Mar. 3, 2004).
1 Council Directive 2000/78, supra note 4, art. 1.
36
Id. art. 2.
1 See Bilka Kaufhaus Gmbh v. Von Hartz, Case C-170/84, EU:C:1986:204; Jenkins v. Kingsgate
(Clothing Productions), Case C-96/80, EU:C:1981:80.
" Council Directive 2000/78, supra note 4, art. 2.
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working conditions, including dismissals and pay." 3 9
Article 4 on occupational requirements is modeled on Article 1(2) of Directive
76/207 on equal treatment for men and women in employment. Article 4 authorizes
States to set rules that treat employees differently based upon age when "the nature of
the particular occupational activities concerned... constitutes a genuine and
determining occupational requirement, provided that the objective is legitimate and
the requirement is proportionate.,40 Article 4(1) states categorically that "occupational
requirements" which satisfy its terms "shall not constitute discrimination." 41 The
Court of Justice has had occasion to apply Article 4 in recent judgments examined in
Part III. Relevant to Article 4 is Recital 17, which declares that the "Directive does not
require the recruitment, promotion, or maintenance in employment or training of an
individual who is not competent, capable and available to perform the essential
functions of the post concerned." 42
Article 6 on the justification of differences in treatment on grounds of age is
manifestly of crucial importance in our later examination of Court judgments in both
Parts II and III. Essentially, Article 6 permits differences of treatment on grounds of
age provided they are "objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate aim,
including legitimate employment policy, labour market and vocational training
objectives," and are achieved by "appropriate and necessary means." 43 Relevant to
Article 6 is Recital 14, which states that the Directive is "without prejudice to national
provisions laying down retirement ages." 44 In addition, Recital 25 declares that
"differences in treatment in connection with age may be justified" in particular on the
basis of "legitimate employment policy, labor market and vocational training objects"
that may vary in different Member States. 45
The other Directive 2000/78 provisions can be reviewed summarily. Article 7
authorizes appropriate positive action (affirmative action), which thus far has not been
relevant to any Court judgment.46 Article 8 permits States to "introduce or maintain
provisions more favorable" than those stated in the Directive. 4 7 Article 9 obligates
States to ensure effective administrative and/or judicial recourse for victims of
discrimination, and is supplemented by Article 17, which requires "effective,
proportionate and dissuasive sanctions." 48 Article 10 provides that when a court or

39 Id. art. 3(1). However, Article 3(3) specifically excludes the Directive's coverage of "payments of
any kind" in state social security or social protection schemes, and Article 3(4) excludes the armed forces
from the prohibition of discrimination based on age. Id. arts. 3(3)-(4).
40
Id. art. 4(1).
41 Id.
42

Id. art. 4 & rec. 17.

43 Id. art. 6(1). The text continues with a description of certain permissible differences of treatment

based on age that the Court of Justice has cited in recent judgments.
44 Id. art. 6(1) & rec. 14.
45 Id. rec. 25. This Recital became especially important in the initial Court judgments reviewed in Part
II.
46
Id. art. 7.
47 Id. art. 8(1). Accordingly, States may go further in protecting persons from discrimination based on
age than the Directive's provisions specifically require.
48 Id. arts. 9 & 17. The language traces back to the well-known precedent, Von Colson & Kamann v.
Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, Case C-14/83, EU:C:1984:153.
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administrative authority concludes that there exists prima facie evidence of direct or
49
indirect discrimination, the burden of proof is shifted to the defendant to rebut this.
Finally, Article 18 provides that Member States must implement the Directive by
appropriate national rules by Dec. 2, 2003, but grants an option to States to extend the
implementation period to Dec. 2, 2006.0
In July 2008, the Commission proposed a new directive that would expand,
beyond the field of employment, the prohibition of discrimination based on religion
or belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation.5 1 The proposed directive's Article 3 on
its scope indicates that the prohibition would then be effective in social security, health
care, education, and the access to and supply of goods and other services, including
housing, to the extent that EU law is applicable. The Council of Ministers and
Parliament have reviewed the proposal for several years, pursuant to TFEU Article 19,
52
which replaced ECT Article 13 on Nov. 1, 2009.
On June 15, 2015, the Council of Ministers distributed to all Member States a
substantially revised proposed directive text, but the Council noted that Germany
opposed it as a violation of the principle of subsidiarity53 and a failure to carry out a
significant cost/benefit analysis. Most States supported the proposal in principle, but
had some reservations. Final legislative action is not likely in the near future, if ever.
II. DIRECTIVE 2000/78'S APPLICATION TO A STATE'S AUTHORIZATION
OR ENDORSEMENT OF A STANDARD RETIREMENT AGE
By far the most important issue concerning possible discrimination in
employment based on age is whether a Member State may authorize employers to
oblige their employees in all forms of employment to retire at a specific age. Even
though some employees opt to take early retirement, in the EU many employees prefer
to work until the specific age set on a national basis for all employees.
National governments do not themselves oblige employees to retire at a given
49 Council Directive 2000/78, supra note 4, art. 10(1). The approach traces back to a leading precedent
in sex-based discrimination in employment, Bilka Kaujhaus, EU:C:1986:204. The approach was later
adopted legislatively in Council Directive 97/80/EC On the Burden of Proof in Cases of Discrimination
Based on Sex, 1998 O.J. (L 14) 6, as amended in Council Directive 98/52/EC, On the Extension of Directive
97/80/EC On the Burden of Proof in Cases of Discrimination Based on Sex to the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, 1998 O.J. (L 205) 66.
5o Council Directive 2000/78, supra note 4, art. 18. (permitting States to delay the Directive's
implementation with regard to age discrimination for a further three years). Belgium, Denmark, Germany,
the Netherlands, and the U.K. all requested an implementation delay. See WATSON, supra note 17, at 420.
5

Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on Implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment

Between Persons Irrespective ofReligion or Belief Disability, Age or Sexual Orientation, COM (2008) 426

final (July 2, 2008).
52
5

See supra note 28.
Council Proposal for a Council Directive on Implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment

Between Persons Irrespective ofReligion or Belief Disability, Age, or Sexual Orientation, 9009/15 SOC

328 ANTIDISCRIM 4 JAI 336 MI 324 FREMP 112 (June 15, 2015). Parliament's opinion, endorsing a
substantially revised Commission proposal, is at EUR. PARL. Doc. A6-0149/2009 (Mar. 20, 2009). The
Treaty of Maastricht introduced the principle of subsidiarity in a new EEC Treaty Article 3b. The successor
provision is the Treaty of Lisbon's TEU Article 5(3). For a brief description of the principle of subsidiarity,
see GOEBEL ET AL., supra note 9, at 171-75.
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age, but they may authorize employers to set a general standard retirement age, and
authorize associations of employers and employees (commonly called the social
partners) to set such a retirement age in collective national or sectoral agreements.
The standard retirement age is customarily set at sixty-five, and occasionally at sixtyseven or sixty-eight.
Inevitably, the Court of Justice has been called upon to consider whether standard
retirement for all employees at a stated age authorized by a Member State constituted
direct discrimination based on age in violation of Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2000/78,
and, if so, whether the terms of Article 6(1) could enable governments to authorize
employers, or collective bargaining agreements, to set a standard retirement age that
is "objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate aim."5 4
A. The Leading Precedent:Palaciosde la Villa5
1. Review of the Judgment
Palacios de la Villa is the Court of Justice's principal precedent concerning the
issue of whether a national compulsory retirement age is compatible with Directive
2000/78. The Court's conclusions were in response to specific questions referred by a
Spanish court in a preliminary reference proceeding pursuant to ECT Article 234 (now
TFEU Article 267):56 whether the plaintiff was the subject of unlawful discrimination
based on age when he had been compulsorily retired at age sixty-five. The Spanish
Court referring the questions manifestly had "serious doubts" concerning the
compatibility of the 2005 law with the Directive. Although essentially limited to the
scope of the referred questions, the Court's conclusions are authoritatively binding.
Because of the importance of this issue, presented for the first time to the Court

54 The Court of Justice's first judgment concerning age-based discrimination in employment was
Mangold v. Helm, Case C-144/04, EU:C:2005:709, published in December 2005. The Grand Chamber
concluded that an employer's use of rather unusual successive fixed-term employment contracts for older
employees could violate the Council Directive 1999/70 on fixed term work, and would also violate Directive
2000/78. Because Germany had delayed the implementation of Directive 2000/78 to Dec. 2, 2006, pursuant
to the Directive's Article 18, the Directive was not yet applicable in Germany. Nonetheless, in the course
of its analysis the Grand Chamber stated that "the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age must
be regarded as a general principle of Community law," an assertion that has obvious jurisprudential
significance. Mangold, EU:C:2005:709, ¶ 75. Judgments discussed in this article have occasionally cited
Mangold, but have analyzed the relevant legal issues through an application of the provisions of Directive
2000/78, not in terms of any "general principle." For academic commentary critical of Mangold, see
Waddington, supra note 19, at 904; see also Editorial Comments, 45 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1571, 1575
(2008).
5 Palacios de la Villa v. Cortefiel Servicios, Case C-411/05, EU:C:2007:604. Palaciosde la Villa has
become the Court's leading precedent, not Mangold. Advocate General Mazak vigorously rejected the
Mangold judgment's "general principle" approach as unjustified, arguing that the provisions of Directive
2000/78 should be the source of the prohibition of age-based discrimination in employment. See Opinion
of Advocate General Mazak, Palacios de la Villa v. Cortefiel Servicios, Case C-411/05, EU:C:2007:106, ¶¶
79-99. For a useful analysis ofthe judgment and Advocate General Mazak's Opinion, seethe case comment
by Prof. Lisa Waddington, supra note 19.
56 For a description of the nature and impact of preliminary reference proceedings, always the principal
source of Court judgments, see GOEBEL ET AL., supra note 9, ch. 3; see also A. ARNULL, THE EUROPEAN
UNION AND ITS COURT OF JUSTICE, ch. 4 (2nd ed. 2006); HARTLEY, supra note 9, ch. 9.
5 Palaciosde la Villa, EU:C:2007:604, ¶ 33.
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of Justice, a Grand Chamber provided the preliminary reference ruling. Since February
1, 2003, when the Treaty of Nice entered into force, the Court of Justice has been
authorized to issue important judgments by a Grand Chamber, currently composed
of fifteen Judges. Although all judgments of the Court of Justice have equal authority
in principle, the examination of novel issues by a Grand Chamber obviously enables
the deliberative participation of more Judges than in a usual five- or three-Judge
Chamber. As is frequently the case when the Court of Justice must examine a highly
significant, novel issue, the Court received valuable assistance through the preliminary
Opinion of an Advocate General. 5 9 The Court's October 16, 2007 judgment in Palacios
de la Villa benefitted from the views ofAdvocate General Jan Mazak in his Opinion.60
Cortefiel, Palacios de la Villa's employer, had retired him at age sixty-five based
on a clause in an applicable textile trade collective agreement. The 2005 Spanish law61
authorized collective agreements to set a retirement age "consistent with employment
policy [such as] increased stability in employment, ... the recruitment of new
workers," and so on.62 The referring court noted as a relevant factor that Spain's
national social security system permitted Palacios de la Villa to draw a retirement
pension at the age of sixty-five, set at 100% of his contribution base. 63
The Grand Chamber held that the Spanish law, when properly interpreted, did not
violate Directive 2000/78. Because national standard retirement provisions impact
"employment and working conditions, including dismissals," which the Directive
expressly includes within its scope under Article 3(1)(c), the Court concluded that
judicial review was warranted, 64 rejecting the contrary view of Advocate General
Mazak.
The Grand Chamber held easily that obliging an employee to retire only because

5 The Treaty of Nice Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the
European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Feb. 26, 2001, 2001 O.J. (C 80) 1, effective
February 1, 2003, amended ECT, art. 221 (now replaced by TFEU, art. 251) to authorize the Court of Justice
to employ a Grand Chamber, instead of a plenary session of all Judges, to decide the more important cases.
This was motivated by the pending increase in Member States (and hence Judges) from fifteen to twentyfive, due to the accession of the Central European nations in 2004, which would make the taking of decisions
by the entire Court cumbersome. The Grand Chamber initially was composed of eleven Judges, later raised
to thirteen, and presently fifteen. The Grand Chamber currently decides about 10% of the Court's docket
of cases, while five Judge Chambers decide over 50%, and three Judge Chambers decide the remainder.
59
N. BURROWS & R. GREAVEs, THE ADVOCATE GENERAL AND EC LAW (2007) (examining the status
and role of Advocates General, and their influence on the Court's judgments and doctrinal development).
As Professor Anthony Arnull has observed, "it is hard to gauge empirically the influence of the Advocate
General on the development of the case law," due to the secrecy of Court deliberations, and the fact that a
Court judgment sometimes parallels and sometimes disagrees with the views of the Advocate General.
ARNULL, supra note 56, at 15. The Court's modern practice of citing Advocate General Opinions frequently,
as well as the published views of former Judges, makes the utility of these Opinions evident. Id. See also
BURROWS & GREAVES, supra note 59, at 30.
60 Op. Advoc. Gen., Palaciosde la Villa, EU:C:2007:106.
61 The former 1980 Spanish law had permitted employers to set sixty-nine as a standard
retirement
age, but this was repealed in 2001.
62 Op. Advoc. Gen., Palaciosde la Villa,
EU:C:2007:106, ¶ 16.
63 Id. ¶
24.
64 Id. ¶¶ 44-47. In the view of Advocate General Mazak, Recital 14 foreclosed
any judicial review of
a "national provision providing for the setting of a compulsory retirement age." Id. ¶¶ 63-67 (quoting him
at ¶ 67).
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the employee reaches a standard retirement age constituted direct discrimination in
65
violation ofArticle 2(2)(a). Accordingly, the crucial issue became whether the direct
discrimination could be "objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate aim"
under the Directive's Article 6(1).66
Because the 2005 law authorized collective agreements to set a specific standard
retirement age, but did not require the agreements to specify any social or employment
policy aim that would justify the retirement age, the referring court questioned whether
the Spanish law complied with the Directive's requirement of a proper justification.
Absent a proper justification, the compulsory retirement could be considered arbitrary.
How, then, could the Court determine what policy motives might justify the 2005
67
Spanish law? Following the views ofAdvocate General Mazak, the Grand Chamber
concluded that "the general context" of the law made up for its "lack of precision, and
enabled "the underlying aim . . . to be identified for [its] judicial review." 68
The Grand Chamber found that Spain's national policy, urged by the social
partners(that is, bodies representing the employers and the employees), was to
"promote better access to employment, by means of better distribution of work
between the generations." 69 The Court cited Advocate General Mazak, who coined the
phrase, "a policy promoting inter-generational employment." 70 Tracing the origin of
Spain's 2005 law back to earlier 1980 legislation and to a 2004 Declaration for Social
Dialogue signed by the government and by employer and union organizations, the
Grand Chamber held that the law's setting of a standard retirement age was
fundamentally intended to "create opportunities in the labour market" for persons
seeking employment, and to enable "the recruitment of new workers." 7 1 Although
rather vague, this certainly fell within the "employment policy and labour market"
justification for age discrimination under Article 6(1).72 In effect, the Court said that
if a State considered it necessary to compel the retirement of older employees solely
to enable access to employment positions for young people, this constituted a
justifiable employment policy.
This did not end the judgment, because Article 6(1) also requires that when a State
measure is intended to achieve a policy goal that justifies age-based discrimination,
the measure must be "appropriate and necessary.
The Court's examination of this
issue has provided crucial doctrinal conclusions followed in later judgments. The
Grand Chamber decided that the 2005 Spanish law satisfied this proportionality
review, because the Member States and the "social partners at national level enjoy
broad discretion" in determining the measures intended to implement social and
employment policy.74 In support of this conclusion, the Court cited Recital 25's
Palaciosde la Villa, EU:C:2007:604, ¶ 51.
Council Directive 2000/78, supra note 4, art. 6(1)
67 Op. Advoc. Gen., Palaciosde la Villa, EU:C:2007:106,
¶ 72.
68 Palaciosde la Villa, EU:C:2007:604,
¶¶ 56-57.
69
Id. T 53.
7o Op. Advoc. Gen., Palaciosde la Villa, EU:C:2007:106,
¶ 71.
71 Palaciosde la Villa, EU:C:2007:604,
¶ 60.
72 Id. ¶¶ 63-66.
n Council Directive 2000/78, supra note 4, art. 6(1).
74 Palacios de la Villa, EU:C:2007:604, ¶ 68. See also ¶ 74; Op. Advoc. Gen., Palacios de la Villa,
65

66
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statement that "specific provisions.. .may vary in accordance with the situation in
Member States." In crucial language, the Court elaborated on Recital 25, holding
that "political, economic, social, demographic, and/or budgetary considerations"
76
might lead to different retirement ages in different States. Moreover, the Court noted
that national provisions might evolve over time to adapt to "changing circumstances
in the employment situation."
The Court's ultimate conclusion was that "[i]t does not appear unreasonable for
the authorities of a Member State" to consider a standard compulsory retirement age
to be "appropriate and necessary" to further "the promotion of full employment." 7 8
The Court ended its proportionality review with a significant comment: "the relevant
legislation is not based only on a specific age," but also takes account of the fact that
"the [retired employees] are entitled to financial compensation by way of a retirement
pension ... the level of which cannot be regarded as unreasonable." 7 9 As noted above,
the relevant collective agreement set the standard retirement age at sixty-five, identical
with the age at which a retired employee could receive a full state retirement pension.
The judgment in Palacios de la Villa is unquestionably the most significant
precedent in the field of age discrimination in employment. The Grand Chamber
accepted in principle that Member States could authorize employers and social
partners to set standard retirement ages, and then enunciated the key standards for
reviewing their justification pursuant to Article 6(1) of Directive 2000/78.
Unquestionably, a crucial motive for this conclusion was the Court's view that State
governments should be entitled to "broad discretion" in determining specific measures
in the fields of social and employment policy, with only limited judicial review.
2. Reflections on Palacios de la Villa
Whether governments could authorize or endorse standard retirement ages for all
forms of employment despite the prohibition of discrimination based on age in
Directive 2000/78 was a novel topic for the Court of Justice. It is not surprising that
the Court would have occasion to examine whether a government's endorsement of a
compulsory retirement age was compatible with Directive 2000/78, because several
States had rules that either endorsed or authorized employers to retire employees at a
set age. Naturally, some employees would want to challenge their compulsory
retirement. A national court confronted with the issue would be quite likely to seek
guidance from the Court of Justice in a preliminary reference proceeding.
The Court of Justice's responses to a national court's questions are directly
intended to provide guidance to that court's resolution of the issues before it.
Nonetheless the Court is always aware that its replies will provide over time
authoritative precedents in other national proceedings. Commentators must exercise
considerable caution when attempting to derive authoritative doctrinal conclusions
EU:C:2007:106, ¶¶ 73-76. He emphasized at ¶ 74 that the Court "should not substitute its own assessment"
for that adopted by the national authorities or social partners.
7 Council Directive 2000/78, supra note 4, rec. 25.
76 Palaciosde la Villa, EU:C:2007:604, ¶ 69.
77
Id. 70.
7 Id. ¶ 72.
79 Id. TT 73, 77.
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from specific preliminary reference judgments.
The Grand Chamber judgment in Palacios de la Villa has provided a number of
authoritative conclusions with regard to national rules authorizing or endorsing
compulsory retirement. The Court's first significant doctrinal conclusion is that
Directive 2000/78's Recital 14 does not foreclose judicial review of a national rule
establishing or endorsing a standard retirement age enabling employers to end a
worker's employment at that age. The Grand Chamber specifically held this in
Palacios de la Villa,80 rejecting the contrary view of Advocate General Mazak, and
the later judgments have followed this determination. This holding has the
consequence that national rules establishing or endorsing a standard retirement age
constitute direct discrimination based on age.
Second, the Grand Chamber held in Palaciosde la Villa that Directive 2000/78's
requirement in Article 6(1) that State rules constituting direct discrimination must be
"objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate [employment policy and labour
market] aim" did not mean that the State's justifications had to be set forth expressly,
but could be derived from the legislative background. 81 This appears to be
pragmatically sensible, inasmuch as the text of legislation concerning a standard
retirement age frequently provides little or no indication of the precise motive for the
legislation, referring only vaguely to social policy. The Grand Chamber was able to
trace the origin of the 2005 Spanish law back to the 2004 Declaration for Social
Dialogue, and thereby ascertain an adequate basis for the social policy intended to
justify the law.
A crucial substantive feature of Palacios de la Villa is its manifestation of the
Court's deference toward the "broad discretion" permitted to national governments in
setting national social and employment policy.82 This is not surprising. Directive
2000/78's title states that it is a "General Framework." The Court has traditionally
been deferential toward Member States in their implementation of directives which by
their nature are intended to be frameworks for national rules. This is bound to be the
case especially when the Court first begins to interpret and apply a directive in a new
field of EU law.
Moreover, the Court of Justice is not politically insensitive. If, in Palacios de la
Villa, the Court had invalidated Spain's standard retirement age when it had been
endorsed in a collective agreement by national associations representing both
employers and employees, the Court judgment would have caused grave problems for
the Spanish government. It is worth noting that Advocate General Mazak observed
that the Court of Justice should not "substitute its own assessment" for that of a
government or of the social partners in determining social and employment policy,
83
and that "only a manifestly disproportionate national measure should be censured."
When the national government effectively delegates the determination of a standard
retirement age to the social partners (national bodies representing employers and
employees), as Spain did in Palaciosde la Villa, the Court's deference is undoubtedly
enhanced. Presumably the Court expects national associations representing employees
soId. 44.
s Id. ¶ 57.
82Id. ¶¶ 68-69.
Op. Advoc. Gen., Palaciosde la Villa, EU:C:2007:106,

¶ 72.
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to negotiate effectively and protect the interests of employees adequately.
In its application of Directive 2000/78's Article 6(1) on justification, the Court's
ultimate conclusion was that Spain could authorize its social partners to set a
compulsory retirement age in order to achieve an "intergenerational balance," obliging
some older workers to retire in order to open employment access for younger people.
The justification for an "inter-generational balance" policy is quite strong when the
rate of unemployment among younger workers is far higher than the average
unemployment rate, as frequently happens in recessions. This was the case in 2007 in
Spain. Eurostat statistics indicate that the unemployment rate of persons under twentyfive was eighteen percent, more than double the general unemployment rate. 84
Because later judgments have frequently cited, and elaborated upon, this policy, we
examine this employment policy view frequently throughout this Article.
The final part of the Grand Chamber's judgment was devoted to an examination
of the proportionality of compulsory retirement at a stated age as Spain's chosen
measure to achieve its employment policy goals. In this context, the Grand Chamber
in Palacios de la Villa emphasized the national government's "broad discretion" in
setting policy in the employment sector, which is obviously a very sensitive one. The
Court stated that the government's discretion is State-specific, and might well differ
among States, due to the great variety of "political, economic, social, demographic,
and/or budgetary considerations." 8 5 Such generous Court deference towards different
State policies can be considered to be pragmatically prudent, because it permits
flexibility and variety in State approaches. However, it does create the risk that in some
cases the Court might accept Member State policies that are based on generalizations,
and even stereotypes, rather than on factually-founded assessments. Professor Elaine
Dewhurst has criticized the Court judgments as rarely requiring more than "meagre
evidence" from Member State governments to justify compulsory retirement ages.86
It is worth noting that the Grand Chamber in Palaciosde la Villa concluded that
"it does not appear unreasonable" for a Member State to endorse a compulsory
retirement age within its discretionary determination of employment policy.8 7 This
level of judicial deference is decidedly permissive-certainly not an illustration of the
8
strict scrutiny often exercised by the Court in gender discrimination judgments.8

84
Eurostat,
Unemployment by
sex
and age - monthly
average (Nov. 2016),
appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=une rt m&lang=en. The employment situation in many
EU States has since deteriorated. Eurostat statistics for 2015 indicate that the average unemployment rate
for all 28 Member States was 9.4%, but much higher (20.3%) for young people aged fifteen to twenty-four.
Spain's statistics were among the worst: its average unemployment rate was twenty-two percent, and its
youth unemployment rate was forty-eight percent.
85 Palacios de la Villa, EU:C:2007:604, ¶¶ 68-69. See also Op. Advoc. Gen., Palacios de la Villa,
EU:C:2007:106, ¶ 73.
86 Dewhurst, supra note 19, at 532.
87 Palaciosde la Villa, EU:C:2007:604, ¶ 72.
88 See, e.g., Kreil v. Germany, Case C-285/98, EU:C:2000:2 (Germany cannot totally prohibit women
from serving in German army posts that involve the use of arms); Ministere Public v. Stoeckel, Case C345/89, EU:C: 1991:324 (the French Labor Code cannot totally prohibit the employment of women in work
at night time).
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B. Age Concern England89
1. Review of the Judgment and Its Stimulus for the Subsequent Elimination of a
Standard Retirement Age in the U.K.
In Age ConcernEngland (2009), the Court's Third Chamber of five judges replied
to a preliminary reference concerning a challenge to the United Kingdom's
Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006. The Regulations expressly authorized
employers to retire employees at age sixty-five (or earlier, if the employer had set a
"normal retirement age"), and also authorized employers to refuse employment to
persons over sixty-five. 90 Naturally, the Third Chamber's conclusions treated the
Grand Chamber's 2007 judgment in Palacios de la Villa as a binding precedent, but
they provided some supplementary observations, which have proved to be quite
influential. As in Palaciosde la Villa, Advocate General Jan Mazak's Opinion clearly
helped the Third Chamber reach its conclusions.
The Third Chamber held easily that the 2006 Regulation's provisions constituted
direct discrimination based on age. 9 1 Whether the Regulations could be objectively
justified in terms of the criteria set in the Directive's Article 6(1) became then the only
issue. Although the Court followed Palaciosand customary case law in holding that
each Member State has "a broad discretion" in implementing a directive, it stated a
crucial caveat: the national rules must be "sufficiently precise and clear and the
persons concerned [must be able to] ascertain the full extent of their rights and.. rely
upon them before the national courts." 92 Significantly, even though the Third Chamber
recognized that the referring court has the responsibility for ultimately determining
whether the U.K. Regulations can be objectively justified pursuant to Article 6(1), it
decided to offer some "clarification designed to give the national court guidance." 93
The Third Chamber informed the U.K. court that although Member States "enjoy
broad discretion" in implementing their social policy, Member States cannot
"[frustrate] the implementation of the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of
age.... [M]ere generalisations concerning the capacity of a specific measure to
contribute to employment policy, labour market or vocational training objectives are
not enough."94 The Court finally declared that a State had "the burden of establishing
to a high standard of proof the legitimacy of the [social policy] aim relied on as a
justification. "95 Thus, without challenging the Grand Chamber's basic conclusions in
Palacios de la Villa, the Third Chamber's "clarification" effectively pressed the
referring court to exercise strict scrutiny in evaluating whether the U.K.'s endorsement

89 R (Age Concern England) v. Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise, and Regulatory Reform,
Case C-388/07, EU:C:2009:128 [hereinafter Age Concern England].
90 Opinion of Advocate General Mazak, R (Age Concern England) v. Secretary of State for Business,
Enterprise, and Regulatory Reform, Case C-388/07, EU:C:2008:518, ¶ 13.
91 Age Concern England, EU:C:2009:128,TT33-34.
9 Id. TT 41-42. Advocate General Mazak reached the same conclusions at greater length in TT 44-51
of his Opinion. Op. Advoc. Gen., Age ConcernEngland, EU:C:2008:518, TT 44-5 1.
93Age Concern England, EU:C:2009:128, ¶ 48.
9 Id. ¶ 51. The Third Chamber cited Regina v. Secretary of State for Employment, Case C-167/97,
EU:C: 1999:60 (a judgment in the field of sex-based employment discrimination).
95 Age Concern England, EU:C:2009:128, T 67.
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of a standard retirement age could be considered to be justifiable and appropriate.
The Third Chamber's admonitions in its "clarification" certainly suggested that
the referring national court, the High Court, would have an arduous task in examining
complex employment policy factors. Justice Blake, however, delivered his judgment
rapidly in The Queen on the Application of Age U.K. on Sept. 25, 2009,96 only six
months after the Court of Justice judgment. His detailed judgment followed hearings
which presented the views of the plaintiff charitable association that had challenged
the U.K.'s 2006 Regulations, those of the U.K. Department of Trade and Industry,
those of employer and employee organizations, and other interested parties. He
followed the guidelines provided by the Court of Justice carefully, observing that the
Court grants "a wide margin of appreciation to national authorities [because they are]
closest to vital forces and particular social issues."97

.

After a detailed review of the testimony and studies, Justice Blake concluded that
the U.K. government's adoption of the 2006 regulations was properly based upon
sufficient social policy concerns for the protection of the labor market, and the
interests of both employers and employees. 98 Notable is his comment that there exists
"an acute policy tension," because "the government's interest in promoting
employment, ... [in obtaining] revenues from people [employed] after 65, reducing
the burden on the state pension, and ensuring that as people live longer they work
longer [with] socially and economically productive lives," must be balanced by "the
need for reassurance, clarity and flexibility to reduce the social cost of regulations, .
. and ensure availability of jobs . . . to workers of different ages." 99 He ultimately
concluded that the U.K.'s "concerns as to the integrity of the labour market and its
short-term competitiveness are social policy aims of a general public interest," and
accordingly did indeed justify the 2006 Regulations. 1 00 However, even though he
reached this crucial conclusion, he raised a serious question concerning the
proportionality of the U.K.'s choice of sixty-five as its standard retirement age.

Justice Blake expressed the view that there were "powerful reasons" for raising
the standard retirement age in view of longer life expectancies and the government's
01
gradual increase of the age for receipt of state old age pensions up to sixty-eight.
He noted that seven other Member States (Austria, Denmark, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Poland, as well as the European commission itself)
also set sixty-five as the standard retirement age, that Sweden, Finland and Portugal
used sixty-seven, sixty-eight, and seventy respectively, and that six others had no
standard retirement age. 102 Ultimately, he accepted provisionally the U.K.
government's setting of the standard retirement age at sixty-five as proportionate only
96 R (on the Application of Age U.K.) v. Secretary of State for Business,
Innovation & Skills, [2009]
EWHC 2236 (Admin). For a review of the U.K.'s 2006 Regulations, and the U.K. government's policy
views leading to the regulations, see M. Sargeant, United Kingdom, in THE LAW ON AGE DISCRIMINATION
IN THE E.U. (Malcolm Sargeant ed., 2008).
97 On the Application ofAge UK, [2009] EWHC 2236 (Admin), ¶ 36.
9Id.
90.
99
Id. 95.
00
. Id.¶ 105.
01
Id. TT 117-118.
102 Id. T 125 (based upon the information available to Justice Blake).
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because the government intended a serious review in 2010 of the currently appropriate
standard retirement age, with a good prospect of raising the age.1 0 3
In 2010, the newly-elected Conservative government of Prime Minister David
Cameron reviewed the standard retirement age of sixty-five as set in the 2006
Regulations, and decided to eliminate any default retirement age. The U.K.'s
Employment Equality (Repeal of Retirement Age Provisions) Regulations 2011104
became effective on October 1, 2011. U.K. employers may no longer rely on the 2006
Regulations to set a compulsory standard retirement age. Employers may, however,
continue to use sixty-five, or the age for receipt of state old-age pensions, to commence
the granting of insurance or financial benefits (presumably an employer pension) to
an employee. 0 5
2. Reflections on Age Concern Englandand the U.K.'s Elimination of a Standard
Retirement Age
As we have observed, in Palacios de la Villa the Grand Chamber took a highly
deferential attitude toward a Member State's rules authorizing social partners and/or
employers to set a standard retirement age. Although necessarily agreeing that
Member States should be considered to have "broad discretion" in establishing or
endorsing a standard retirement age, the Third Chamber in Age Concern England
prudently observed that Member States cannot rely on "mere generalizations" when
adopting employment policy measures, and had to meet a high burden of proof when
attempting to justify discrimination in employment based on age.
The Third Chamber's helpful "clarification" can be applauded as urging a
measure of stricter scrutiny in the examination of any policy justification alleged to
support a compulsory retirement age. Although the Grand Chamber's judgment in
Palaciosde la Villa must certainly be regarded as the most authoritative precedent, the
Court's conclusion that national governments should enjoy a "broad discretion" in
adopting measures in the sector of employment may well be too generous.
Accordingly, it may be hoped that in the future when the Court of Justice or national
courts have occasion to examine the justification for any government-endorsed
standard retirement age, they will be influenced by the cautious "clarification" of the
Third Chamber and exercise a degree of strict scrutiny.
Justice Blake of the U.K. High Court took careful note of the Third Chamber's
admonitions both in his thorough examination of the views of the government,
employers, and employees, and in his thoughtful appraisal of the U.K.'s standard
retirement age. He is to be praised for his pragmatic conclusion that the U.K.'s thenstandard retirement age of sixty-five was no longer appropriate in view of longer life
expectancies and the government's gradual increase of the initial age for receipt of the
state old-age pension. His judgment provided the impetus for the review of the issue
by Prime Minister Cameron's government and its somewhat surprising total

"o Id. TT 126-130.
104 Employment Equality (Repeal of Retirement Age Provisions) Regulations, 2011,
S.I. 2011/1069
(U.K.).
15 Id. art. 2(4).
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elimination of any standard retirement age. The U.K. government's action may in turn
influence other governments in the future, especially in the light of the demographic
developments discussed below in Part II.E.
C. Later Judgments: Rosenbladtl06 and Hornfeldto7
Subsequently, in 2010, the Grand Chamber judgment in Rosenbladtresponded to
questions referred by the Hamburg Labor Court (Arbeitsgericht) that essentially
inquired whether a collective agreement in a specific sector permitting employers to
end an employment contract at sixty-five could be justified under the Directive's
Article 6(1). The referred questions raised several issues that had not been addressed
in Palacios de la Villa: notably, whether compulsory retirement can be considered
justifiable even when it results in severe financial hardship for some employees. The
Grand Chamber's judgment in Rosenbladt naturally applied on an analogous basis the
doctrinal approach taken in Palacios de la Villa, but it added several new judicial
conclusions. The Court had the benefit of a detailed Opinion provided by Advocate
General Verica Trstenjak.
The 1987 collective agreement for employees in the building cleaning sector in
Germany provided that employment ended at sixty-five, unless specifically provided
otherwise. The Labor Court's referred questions clearly indicated that the relevant
collective agreement conformed to an "established practice in place for several
decades," even though this took no account of "the economic, social and demographic
situation and the situation actually prevailing on the employment market." 0 8 In 2008,
Mrs. Rosenbladt, the plaintiff, was retired by her employer when she reached the age
of sixty-five. She then challenged the 1987 collective agreement as a violation of the
Directive. A 2006 German law intended to carry out Directive 2000/78 essentially
replicated the Directive's provisions, specifically permitting age discrimination
compatible with Article 6(1). 109 Although entitled to a state old-age pension, her
pension only amounted to a relatively modest £253 monthly-about five-sixths of her
former monthly salary.1 1 0 The referring court expressed its concern that "the statutory
old age pension [was] not sufficient to meet the basic need of workers" in a poorlypaid sector, such as workers in the commercial cleaning sector." Since her retirement
was based solely on age, clearly direct discrimination, the issue became whether it
could be justified under Article 6(1). Citing Palacios de la Villa and Age Concern
England, the Grand Chamber emphasized the broad discretion enjoyed by a Member
State and the social partners in a specific sector when carrying out the Directive,
observing that this enabled them to make policy determinations flexibly, taking into
account "the overall situation in the labour market" and "the specific features of
[particular] jobs." 112 The Grand Chamber particularly noted the German

106
107

Rosenbladt v. Oellerking Gebaudereinigungsges MbH, Case C-45/09, EU:C:2010:601.
Hornfeldt v. Posten Meddelande, Case C-141/11, EU:C:2012:421.

Rosenbladt, EU:C:2010:601, ¶ 28.
Id. ¶¶ 8-11.
110 Id. ¶¶ 20-26.
111 Id. ¶ 71.
112 Id. ¶¶ 41, 49. See also Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak, Rosenbladt v. Oellerking
Gebaudereinigungsges MbH, Case C-45/09, EU:C:2010:227, TT 87-89. The Advocate General noted that
10o

109
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Government's contention that the 1987 collective agreement reflected a "political and
social consensus which has endured for many years in Germany." 1 1 3 The motivating
policy was one promoting inter-generational employment, "based primarily on the
notion of sharing employment between the generations," and the facilitation of the
employment of younger workers, especially during periods of chronic employment.114
The Court further noted that Germany's 2006 law took into consideration the fact that
retired employees would receive "replacement income" through the state pension
system.115 The Grand Chamber's ultimate conclusion reinforced that in Palaciosde la
Villa: the "automatic termination of employment contracts" at a specific age could be
considered a long-standing "feature of employment law in many Member States based
on the balance . . . between political, economic, social, demographic and / or
budgetary considerations .... 116 Accordingly, the compulsory retirement provision
could be considered justified, presumably determined in a highly complex
governmental political process. 117 After determining whether a law or collective
agreement can be evaluated as "justified" in terms ofArticle 6(1), the Court invariably
applies the principle of proportionality to determine whether its provisions are
appropriate and necessary in the specific context of the referred questions. The Grand
Chamber emphasized that the retired employees would receive "replacement income
in the form of a retirement pension,"" 8 a crucial factor cited in Palacios de la Villa.
The Court also emphasized that the compulsory retirement was based upon a provision
in a Collective Agreement concluded by the "social partners," and not based upon a
unilateral decision of an employer.1 1 9 Ultimately, the Grand Chamber concluded, as it
had in Palaciosde la Villa, that "it does not appear unreasonable" for the German
government to consider that the compulsory retirement provision constituted an
appropriate measure within its national employment policy.120
The Grand Chamber then briefly provided its views in response to other related
121
questions referred, essentially repeating the analysis summarized above.
In this
context the Court dealt with the key new issue that differentiates Rosenbladt from
Palacios de la Villa. The referring court had expressed its serious concern about the
impact of automatic termination of employment upon persons who might, like Mrs.
Rosenbladt, suffer significant financial hardship.122 The Grand Chamber emphasized
the Member State's need to balance individual versus societal interests, claiming
when a Member State entrusted social partners with the power to set a standard retirement age, the
government must ensure that the age fulfills the conditions of the Directive's Article 7(1), and is specific to
the sector for which the social partners are competent. Id. ¶¶ 99, 101.
113 Rosenbladt, EU:C:2010:601, ¶ 43. The Court had just noted the referring court's observation that
collective agreement clauses providing for compulsory retirement at the retirement age had been used for
decades, without regard to "social and demographic conditions." Id. ¶ 42.
14
1 Id. T 43.
115 Id. ¶¶ 43, 48. The Grand Chamber also cited the German Government's view that an automatic
retirement at age sixty-five avoided the risk of the "humiliation" of employees who are terminated because
they are "no longer capable of working." Id. ¶ 43.
116
117

Id.
Id.

¶ 44.
¶ 45, 53.

¶

118 Id. 48.
119 Rosenbladt, EU:C:2010:601,
120 Id. ¶
51.
121 Id. ¶¶ 54-69.
22
1 Id. ¶ 71.

¶ 49.
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"account must be taken both of the hardship [that automatic termination of
employment contracts may cause] the persons concerned and of the benefits derived
from it by society in general .. 123 In this context, the Grand Chamber did not address
the issue of particularly serious financial hardship to individual workers. The Court
did observe that the termination of the employment contract did not in itself constitute
"a mandatory scheme of automatic retirement" and did not compel Mrs. Rosenbladt
to "withdraw definitively from the labour market." 1 2 4 She could continue to seek
employment on other terms from her employer or other possible employers, and any
denial of employment could not be based on her age. 1 2 5
When the Grand Chamber refrained from considering the financial hardship
circumstances of individual employees, it may have been influenced by Advocate
General Trstenjak, who took the view that the Court's review of the standard
retirement age set by a State or its social partners should not be affected by the
unfortunate circumstances of individual workers. 1 2 6
The final directly relevant judgment is Hornfeldt v. Posten Meddelande,12 7 the
Court's Second Chamber reply in 2012 to a preliminary reference from a Swedish
court inquiring about the compatibility of a 2008 Swedish Law with Directive
2000/78. The 2008 Law, intended to implement the Directive, authorized employers
to set a standard retirement age of sixty-seven, but not less than sixty-seven. The
Swedish court noted that Sweden's prior standard retirement age of sixty-five had been
raised to sixty-seven in 1991. Because Hornfeldt, the plaintiff in the Swedish
proceedings, had only worked part-time for the Swedish postal service from 1989 to
2009, his retirement pension, financed by contributions during employment, was
relatively modest when he was retired in May 2009 on reaching the age of sixty-seven.
The Swedish court inquired whether the 2008 law's failure to provide a precise
"legitimate aim" for its provisions violated Article 6(1) of the Directive. In responding
to this question, the Second Chamber followed Palaciosde la Villa, although it cited
Rosenbladt instead of Palacios.The Court initially stated that the legislation need not
state its aim precisely, if this can be appropriately determined otherwise. The Court
then noted that the "preparatory documents" for the 2008 law did provide employment
policy and labor policy justifications for its provisions, and observed that the referring
court had indicated that one motive was to open "posts for younger workers on the
labour market." 1 2 8 The Second Chamber concluded that the Swedish government's
objectives did justify the compulsory retirement provisions. Citing Rosenbladt, the
court noted that the compulsory retirement of older workers had long been a feature
of employment in many States, justified by "political, economic, social, demographic
and/or budgetary considerations."1 2 9 The Court also noted the government view that

Id. ¶ 73. See also Op. Advoc. Gen., Rosenbladt, EU:C:2010:227,
Rosenbladt, EU:C:2010:601, ¶ 75.
Id. ¶ 74.
126 See Op. Advoc. Gen., Rosenbladt, EU:C:2010:227,
¶¶ 160-165.
123

24

1

125

27

1

128
29

1

Hornfeldt, EU:C:2012:421.
Id. ¶¶ 25-26.
Id.T28.

¶¶

160-165.
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the "age limit reflects the political and social consensus [of the social partners]."13 0
After concluding that Sweden's 2008 law authorizing employers to retire their
employees at sixty-seven was justified in terms of Article 6(1) of Directive 2000/78,
the Second Chamber considered whether the 2008 law could be qualified as
"appropriate and necessary." The Court held that it did qualify, observing that it
enabled adaptation to demographic developments and the anticipation of the risk of
labor shortages, and avoided terminating employment contracts "in situations which
are humiliating for elderly workers."
The Second Chamber then turned to the Swedish court's basic question
concerning whether the Swedish law satisfied the principle of proportionality when it
enabled employers to retire employees at sixty-seven when they, like Homfeldt, would
not receive a substantial contribution-based retirement pension. The Court first noted
that the 2008 law does not authorize employers or collective agreements to set an
automatic termination of employment prior to sixty-seven, thus ensuring an
employee's "unconditional right to continue his professional activity until his 67th
birthday."132 As it had in Rosenbladt, the Court further noted that an employer's
retirement of an employee at sixty-seven did not constitute "a mandatory scheme of
automatic retirement," because the employer and employee remain free to enter into a
fixed-term employment contract after the employee becomes sixty-seven.
The Second Chamber noted that the Rosenbladtjudgment had emphasized that an
employer-set retirement age should take into account the retiree's ability to obtain
"replacement income in the form of a retirement pension." 1 3 4 The Court then observed
that if the earnings-related pension is low, it could be supplemented by a government
retirement pension, housing benefit, and/or old-age benefit.
The Second Chamber
left it to the referring court to make the ultimate determination as to whether these
possibilities of supplemental income for Hornfeldt satisfied the criterion set in
13 6

Rosenbladt.

1. Reflections on Rosenbladt and Hornfeldt
Although the Grand Chamber judgment in Rosenbladt and that of the Second
Chamber in Hornfeldt provide a useful supplement to Palacios de la Villa, they are
somewhat disappointing when contrasted with the Third Chamber's exercise of stricter
scrutiny in its judgment in Age Concern England.
Citing Palaciosde la Villa, the Grand Chamber in Rosenbladtlaid great emphasis
on the "broad discretion" enjoyed by Member States and their "social partners" in the
determination of specific measures in the field of employment policy. 1 In
30

Id.T27.

Id. ¶¶ 33-34. Presumably the Court considered that requiring an employer to determine that an
employee was not physically or mentally capable of performing the employment functions would be
"humiliating" for the employee.
32
1 Id. T 39.
33
Id. ¶¶ 40-41.
134 Id. ¶ 42.
135 Id. ¶¶ 43-44.
131

136
37

Id.T46.
Rosenbladt, EU:C:2010:601,

¶ 41.
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Rosenbladt, as in Palaciosde la Villa, the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five had
been set by the appropriate "social partners"-in this instance, those in the building
cleaning sector. As previously noted with regard to Palaciosde la Villa, the Court's
deference to employment policy measures adopted by the "social partners" is not
surprising, in light of the continental European view that associations representing
employees can be trusted to protect adequately the interests of all employees.
More questionable is the Court's acceptance of Germany's contention that the
mandatory retirement provisions of the 1987 collective agreement examined in
Rosenbladt reflected a "political and social consensus which endured for many years
in Germany." 13 8 Although that historical perspective is certainly accurate, one might
wonder why the Court of Justice did not scrutinize the policy issues concerned more
rigorously, when considering for the first time whether this specific mandatory
retirement age can be considered justified under the recent Directive 2000/78.
The Grand Chamber's ultimate conclusion that "it does not appear unreasonable"
for the German government to endorse the compulsory retirement agel39 certainly
manifests a rather loose standard of scrutiny. The value provided by a strict scrutiny
approach would appear to be particularly warranted in Rosenbladt, where the motive
for the reference was the national court's clearly expressed concern for the likelihood
that a retired cleaner would receive an inadequate pension, and in Hornfeldt, based on
the parallel concern by the referring Swedish Court with regard to the retired part-time
postal worker,140 as there are manifestly important human rights concerns. What, then,
constituted the policy that the Court accepted to justify the endorsement of the
compulsory retirement at sixty-five by the German government in Rosenbladt, and at
sixty-seven by the Swedish government in Hornfeldt?
In Palacios de la Villa, the Court accepted that a crucial motive for the
government's setting or endorsing a standard retirement age was to achieve an intergenerational balance between the interests of younger, mid-career, and older workers,
and specifically to promote the recruitment of young workers.141 Rosenbladtpresented
this justification for a compulsory retirement age as one based upon a longstanding
"political and social consensus," 142 while Hornfeldt stressed the policy goal of
promoting employment opportunities for younger workers.143 Seeking to achieve a
balance among the interests of younger, mid-career, and older workers is manifestly a
valid feature of a State's employment policy. There is solid evidence that supports
treating it as an appropriate policy concern. We previously noted that Eurostat statistics
indicated that the unemployment rate of persons under twenty-five in Spain in 2007,
the date of Palaciosde la Villa, was eighteen percent, more than double the general
unemployment rate. In Sweden, the rate of unemployment among persons under
twenty-five was twenty-five percent, three times the general unemployment rate, at
the time of the Hornfeldtjudgment, providing support for the Court's deference to the

138 Id.

43.
Id. ¶ 51.
1 1
Id. 71; see also Hornfeldt, EU:C:2012:421, TT 18, 36.
141 Palacios de la Villa, EU:C:2007:106,
¶ 53.
142 Rosenbladt, EU:C:2010:601,
¶ 43.
143 Hornfeldt, EU:C:2012:421,
¶¶ 25-26.
39

1

40
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Swedish employment policy. In contrast, in Germany, there existed only a minor
difference in the youth unemployment rate as compared with the average
unemployment rate at the time of the Rosenbladtjudgment.144
Both the Grand Chamber in Rosenbladt and the Second Chamber in Hornfeldt
stressed that a State's determination or endorsement of a standard retirement age could
not be construed as achieving mandatory retirement at that age.145 A retired employee
must be able to seek alternative employment on a fixed-term basis with the same or a
different employer. Unfortunately, this judicial conclusion is unlikely to benefit older
employees with limited skills who are apt to find few remunerative employment
opportunities in sectors such as cleaning, clerical work, or work in restaurants after
being terminated at a standard retirement age.146
It would seem unquestionable that the standard retirement age ought to be one at
which the retired person is eligible for "replacement income" provided by the state
pension system. The judgments in Palaciosde la Villa, Rosenbladt, and Hornfeldt all
make reference to this,147 without stating that it is an essential condition. To put it
bluntly, older workers are being required to sacrifice their jobs when reaching
compulsory retirement age in order to open employment positions for younger
workers. Accordingly, linking a standard retirement age to the age of initial receipt of
a state old-age pension certainly represents sound public policy-most retired
individuals are apt to need the assurance of economic support from the state at the
time of any compulsory retirement. Arguably, such a link also represents fair play. It
is likely that the Court considers that the compulsory retirement of an employee can
be found justifiable even when the state pension benefit, based on prior employee
contributions, is so modest as to leave the retired individual in financial distress. In
Rosenbladt, Advocate General Trstenjak took the view that the concern for the
financial distress of individuals is irrelevant, best left as a concern in the context of a
State's social welfare policies.148 The Grand Chamber never directly addressed the
issue. The issue is certainly significant. As Professor Dewhurst has observed, "there is
substantial evidence . . . that older workers, despite reasonable pension levels, are
amongst the most impoverished group in the EU." 149 Accordingly, it is unfortunate
that the Grand Chamber failed to adopt any formal conclusions concerning the issue.
It is somewhat surprising, and regrettable, that the only reference to the Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union15 0 occurs in the Second Chamber's
judgment in Hornfeldt. As previously noted, Article 6 of the Lisbon TEU accorded the
Charter "the same legal value as the Treaties." 15 1 After the TEU entered into force on
144 See Eurostat, supra note 84. Germany does not usually have a great disparity
between the average
unemployment rate and that for young workers. In 2010, the date of the Rosenbladt judgment, average
unemployment was seven percent, and the youth unemployment rate was 9.8%.
145 Rosenbladt, EU:C:2010:601, ¶¶ 74-77; Hornfeldt,
EU:C:2012:421, ¶ 40.
146 Dewhurst, supra note
19, at 538.
147 Palacios de la Villa, EU:C:2007:106,
¶ 73; Rosenbladt, EU:C:2010:601, ¶ 48; Hornfeldt,
EU:C:2012:421, ¶ 42.
148 Op. Advoc. Gen., Rosenbladt,
EU:C:2010:227, ¶ 163.
149 Dewhurst, supra note
19, at 537.
150 Hornfeldt, EU:C:2012:421.
151 TEU,
art. 6.
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December 1, 2009, Court judgments ought to refer to any relevant Charter provisions.
Although the Second Chamber did this in Hornfeldt, the Grand Chamber in
Rosenbladt did not. Obviously relevant is the Charter's Article 25 on the rights of the
elderly, which requires the EU to respect "the rights of the elderly to lead a life of
dignity and independence." 1 5 2 Although one might have hoped that the Court in
Rosenbladt would have made reference to the Charter's admonition that older
employees should have the financial means to enjoy "dignity and independence" when
retired, it is true that Article 25 is more of an aspiration than a specific right.
More plausibly relevant is Article 15 on the freedom to choose an occupation and
the right to engage in work, which declares paragraph (1) that "[e]veryone has the
right to engage in work."1 5 3 The Second Chamber in Hornfeldt stated that Directive
2000/78's prohibition of age-based discrimination in employment ought to be "read in
the light of the right to engage in work recognized in Article 15(1).",154 The Second
Chamber then cited several of Directive 2000/78's recitals, notably with regard to the
need "to increase [older workers'] participation in the labour force" and to promote
"the standard of living and the quality of life." 155 Although the Second Chamber in
Hornfeldt cited Charter's Article 15(1) and the recitals in Directive 2000/78, the Court
ultimately concluded that the Swedish law authorizing employers and social partners
to set a standard retirement age of sixty-seven was not unreasonable and fell within
their margin of discretion in determining employment policy.156 The Second Chamber
may have felt obliged to reach this conclusion in view of the parallel conclusion of the
Grand Chamber in Rosenbladt.
Whether Articles 15(1) and 25 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which now
has Treaty force, ought to influence the determination of the validity of alleged
justifications for compulsory retirement is a serious question that the Court of Justice
ought to address. Let us hope that the Court will have occasion to do so in the near
future.
D. Comparisons with the Age Discriminationin Employment Act
1. The ADEA's Adoption and Evolution
Up to this point, we have critically examined Palacios de la Villa and the other
three EU Court judgments that concluded that national rules authorizing or endorsing
compulsory retirement are compatible with Directive 2000/78. We can now make
some worthwhile comparisons with the U.S. rules set out in the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA). The evolution of U.S. law concerning employer-set
compulsory retirement ages is a remarkable story. Within the span of 19 years, from
1967 to 1986, the federal law shifted from endorsing a compulsory retirement age set
at sixty-five, to age seventy, and then to the almost total elimination of an employer's
Charter, art. 25.
Charter, art. 15(1). Professor Dewhurst argues that the right to work in Charter art. 15(1) should be
considered relevant in some contexts of age-based discrimination in employment. Dewhurst, supra note 19,
539-42.
54
1 Hornfeldt, EU:C:2012:421, ¶37.
152
153
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Id.
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Id. TT 38-44.
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power to set a compulsory retirement age for employees-each time without
significant controversy.
When Congress adopted the Civil Rights Act (1964), which prohibited
discrimination based upon race, color, sex, religion, or national origin in
employment,
they also directed the Secretary of Labor to provide a report on
whether specific legislation was necessary to deal with discrimination in employment
based on age. The June 1965 Report, "The Older American Worker - Age
Discrimination in Employment," 15 8 presented by Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz,
provided a comprehensive study with evidence of discrimination against older
employees, based in large part on stereotypes. The Report found that arbitrary age
discrimination not only prevented individual workers from engaging in productive and
satisfying employment, it also deprived the national economy of tax resources. The
Report's recommendation of corrective legislative action ultimately led to the
adoption by Congress of the 1967 ADEA, 1 5 9 currently codified as amended in 29
U.S.C. §§ 621-32. The Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose for the 1967
ADEA merits quotation:
(1) In the face of rising productivity and affluence, older workers
find themselves disadvantaged in their efforts to retain employment,
and especially to regain employment when displaced from jobs; (2)
the setting of arbitrary age limits regardless of potential for job
performance has become a common practice... ; (3) the incidence
of unemployment, especially long-term unemployment ... is,
relative to the younger ages, high among older workers; their
numbers are great and growing; and their employment problems
grave; (4) the existence in industries affecting commerce, of
arbitrary discrimination in employment because of age, burdens
commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce.160
The first three of the Statements of Findings and Purpose provide general
illustrations of age-based discrimination, but all are also clearly relevant to
compulsory retirement. The findings all draw attention to the harmful economic and
social impact of compulsory retirement on older workers. The fourth finding
presumably was intended to establish that Congress had the power to legislate under
1 61
the interstate commerce clause.
The focus of the 1967 ADEA and its subsequent amendments is stated in Section
4(a) as being to protect all persons over the age of forty from any form of
discrimination in employment in hiring, promotion, dismissal, pay and benefits, and
157

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 703 (2016).

15

U.S.

SEC'Y OF LABOR, REPORT ON THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER: AGE DISCRIMINATION
IN

EMPLOYMENT (1965).
159

Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967).

For a general review of the ADEA, see SAMUEL ESTREICHER& MICHAEL HARPER, CASESAND MATERIALS
ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 413-486 (4th ed. 2012); HAROLD LEWIS JR. & ELIZABETH J.
NORMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND PRACTICE 424-468 (2d ed. 2004); BARBARA T.
LINDEMANN ETAL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW ch. 12 (5th ed. 2012).

U.S.C. § 621(a) (2016).
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl 3.
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any other conditions of employment. 162 Although compulsory retirement is not
specifically mentioned in the list, "dismissal" would certainly include dismissal
through compulsory retirement. Because this Article only concerns compulsory
retirement, most of the provisions of the ADEA are not relevant. Section 12 of the
1967 ADEA provided its scope: it protected older employees only until they reached
the age of sixty-five.163 In 1967, sixty-five was the age of eligibility for full federal
social security pension benefits, which made sixty-five a plausible retirement age.
Employers customarily set sixty-five as the retirement age whether or not they
provided old age retirement pensions. The ADEA's limitation of its protective scope
in Section 12 to persons over forty means that there is no prohibition of any age
discrimination against younger workers and therefore no parallel to Directive
2000/78's inclusion of younger workers among those protected against age-based
discrimination.164 Furthermore, the 1967 ADEA's scope was limited by a de minimis
exception-employers employing fewer than twenty-five employees for twenty or
more weeks in a calendar year are not covered.165 Directive 2000/78, of course, has
no parallel de minimis provision. Finally, the 1967 ADEA contained a general
exception in Section 4(f), currently found in 29 U.S.C. § 631: employers may
discriminate based on age when objectively justified by essential job performance
criteria-the "bona-fide occupational qualification"166 provision. Part III.C below
contrasts some of the Court of Justice judgments concerning specific professions or
fields of employment reviewed in Part III.A with the application of this "bona-fide
occupational qualification" provision and other relevant legislative exceptions to the
ADEA's prohibition of compulsory retirement. Only ten years after the initial ADEA's
entry into force, a Democratic Congress during the administration of President Jimmy
Carter adopted the 1978 ADEA,167 which amended Section 12 to provide for the
protection of older employees until the age of seventy (not sixty-five). Based on
committee reports, the Congress found that a significant number of older employees
desired to continue employment after the age of sixty-five and were physically and
mentally capable of carrying out employment requirements. This finding motivated
the raising of the ADEA's protective provisions to the age of seventy, which prevented
employers from imposing compulsory retirement on older workers before that age.168
Moreover, Section 5 of the 1978 ADEA essentially eliminated any mandatory
retirement age for federal government employees, except in a few limited sectors.169
Finally, Section 6 mandated the Secretary of Labor to study whether the seventy year
age limit should be eliminated.17 0 n a 1983 opinion authored by Justice Brennan in
See § 4, 81 Stat. at 603.
Id. § 12.
164 For Court judgments protecting young workers from age-based discrimination,
see, e.g., Hutter v.
Technische Universitat Graz, Case C-88/08, EU:C:2009:381; Felber v. Bundesministerin fur Unterricht,
Case C-529/13, EU:C: 2015:20.
165 § 11(b), 81 Stat. at 605 (amended on April 8, 1974 to reduce the de minimis number of employees
from 25 to 20).
166 Id. § 4(f) (currently 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (2016)).
67
1 Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189
(1978) (amending the 1967 ADEA).
168 Id. § 3. See ESTREICHER & HARPER, supra
note 159, at 470.
169§ 5, 92 Stat. 189,
190-91.
70
1 Id. § 6.
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Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Wyoming,
the Supreme Court
upheld the power of Congress to adopt the ADEA under its constitutional power to
regulate interstate commerce. In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens contended
strongly that Congress had the power to adopt the ADEA pursuant to the interstate
commerce clause, declaring that "Congress has ample power to regulate the terms and
conditions of employment throughout the economy."172 The Court's further holding
that the ADEA's coverage of the employees of state governments was constitutionally
permissible is discussed below in Part III.C.
Ultimately, after several years of hearings, studies, and reports, Congress adopted
and President Ronald Reagan signed the 1986 ADEA,1 71 whose Section 12 took the
radical step of eliminating any federally-authorized compulsory retirement age,
although with certain limited exceptions discussed in Part III,C. Congressional
committee reports and hearings indicated a variety of motives for the elimination of
any compulsory retirement age, none clearly decisive, but persuasive in
combination. 174 Certainly a highly relevant consideration was demographic-the
steadily increasing longevity of older persons, many physically and mentally capable
of employment past seventy. To the extent that the elimination of a mandatory
retirement age would enable some older persons to continue employment, or to obtain
new full or part-time employment, their earnings would provide added tax and social
security revenues, as well as enabling them to maintain their customary life styles.
A May 17, 1984 statement of the influential American Association of Retired
Persons (AARP)1 7 5 provides a good description of compelling motives for the 1986
ADEA. The statement strongly advocated the removal of the seventy-year cutoff of
ADEA protection for older persons, arguing that it permitted employment
discrimination against qualified persons and that employment should be based solely
on ability, without regard to arbitrary age limits. The statement also emphasized that
many older persons had limited financial resources and needed revenue from
employment. The bill, which the AARP advocated, did not get to a vote in that session
of Congress, but the next 99th Congress acted on a similar bill.
The Report of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 176 provides
valuable background on the motivation for the elimination of any endorsed mandatory
retirement age. The report noted that thirteen states had already eliminated mandatory
retirement for both public and private sector employees. The Report also cited a 1982
Labor Department study that indicated that elimination of mandatory retirement would

EEOC v. Wyoming., 460 U.S.

226, 234-43 (1983). The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, which enforced the 1964 Civil Rights Act in the employment sector, obtained the jurisdiction
to enforce the ADEA in 1978 through Reorganization Plan No. I of 1978, 92 Stat. 3781 (1978).
172 EEOC v. Wyoming.,
460 U.S. at 248.
17' Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-592, § 620-31, 100
Stat. 3342 (1986).
the A ing C nder the Age Discrimination
174 The in
Removal
Employment Act:
fheJoint
Age C
C
171

&

HearingBefore the H. Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the Comm. on Education and Labor
H Subcomm. on Health and Long-term Care ofthe Selection Comm. on Ageing, 99th Cong. (1986).
175 Hearing before the H. Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the
Comm. of Education

Labor, 98th Cong. 216 (2d Sess.1984).
176 H.R. Rep. No. 99-756
(1986).
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add approximately 200,000 individuals to the labor force by 2000. 177 Numerous
national associations supported the bill, including the AARP, the American Federation
of Teachers, the National Council of Senior Citizens, the National Council on the
Aging, and the AFL/CIO Department on Occupational Safety, Health and Social
Security. Studies indicated that large majorities of people surveyed on the issue
supported an end to mandatory retirement.1 7 8
Florida Congressman Claude Pepper, chairman of the Subcommittee on Health
and Long-term Care, and the sponsor of what ultimately became the 1986 ADEA,
179
provided a valuable Subcommittee Report, "Eliminating Mandatory Retirement,"
in support of the bill. The Report initially noted a relevant demographic factor: the
average life expectancy was 61.7 years when the Social Security pension eligibility
age was adopted in 1935, but had risen to 74.2 in 1981.1 The Report also noted an
"increasing interest in the philosophy that ageism is as unconscionable a form of
discrimination as sexism." 8 1 The Subcommittee Report cited Labor Department data
which estimated that 195,000 older men would be compelled to retire by the year 2000
if seventy continued as the acceptable retirement age.182 A major factor in the Report
was its forecast that there would be a substantial economic benefit from enabling
employees to continue work past the age of seventy, citing a 1985 actuarial study that
estimated that these employees would generate over $3 billion in added social security
and other governmental revenues. 8 3 This would be the case even though most workers
opted to retire before the age of sixty-five.
Although the 1986 ADEA was based on the bill sponsored by Congressman
Claude Pepper (incidentally, at age eighty-six, the oldest member of Congress), crucial
bi-partisan support was provided in the Senate by Democratic Senator Howard
Metzenbaum and Republican Senator John Heinz. As previously noted, the hearing
and reports on the bill which become the ADEA indicated almost no opposition to the
total elimination of any federal endorsement of an employer-set compulsory
retirement age, except from some business organizations. The principal critical
comments concerned the various specific exceptions that authorized compulsory
retirement in specific sectors. Part III.C provides a description of these exceptions in
contrast to the Court of Justice judgments.
The Congressional adoption of the 1986 ADEA, effectively prohibiting any
standard employer-set compulsory retirement age, achieved a highly significant
modification of U.S. employment policy. Even though relatively few employees
choose to remain in their occupations past the age of seventy, their civil right to do so
has been recognized. Although undoubtedly relatively minor in economic importance,
the elimination of virtually all compulsory retirement provides a great social benefit
to those older employees who prefer to continue in employment, or find it financially
177 Id.
178
79

1

at 3.
Id. at 4.
CLAUDE PEPPER, ELIMINATING MANDATORY RETIREMENT, H.R. DOC. No. 99-561,
at 3 (2d Sess.

1986).

.80 Id. at 5.
181 Id. at 6.
182 Id. at 7 (there was no comparable data concerning women employees).
183 Id. at 13.
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2. The Contrast with the European Union
The prohibition of almost all compulsory retirement in the United States is in
sharp contrast to the situation in the EU, based on national rules in some Member
States that authorize or endorse employer-set compulsory retirement. Does the U.S.
approach provide a basis for serious criticism of that in the EU? There are two reasons
why that should not be the case. The first is that the European Union is not a state (and
never will be). Even though the EU has a Treaty-based constitutional structure, its
Member States have autonomy except insofar as they have conferred powers on the
EU's political and judicial institutions, or limited their sovereign rights by Treaty
provisions. 8 5
The Treaty of Lisbon's TFEU states in Article 149 of the Title on Employment
that the Parliament and Council are only authorized to adopt "incentive measures
designed to encourage cooperation between Member States" in the employment
sector, and not to adopt measures for the harmonization of national law.186 The prior
ECT Article 129, in effect since the Employment Title was added by the Treaty of
Amsterdam on May 1, 1999, made the same stipulations with regard to the Council,18 7
the only institution then authorized to adopt measures concerning employment.
Accordingly, the EU political institutions do not appear to have any legislative power
to harmonize national rules on employment with regard to a stated or compulsory
retirement age, either to set sixty-five or any other age, or to eliminate any national
endorsement of a compulsory retirement age. This is in sharp contrast to the United
States, where, as noted, the Supreme Court in Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission v. Wyoming held that Congress had the power to regulate the terms and
conditions of employment, including compulsory retirement, under its constitutional
power to regulate interstate commerce.
Directive 2000/78 cannot be read to require implicitly any common standard
retirement age throughout the EU, or to eliminate all national standard retirement ages,
because, as previously emphasized, the Court of Justice has authoritatively recognized
the "broad discretion" of Member States in determining their fundamental social and
The Court might at most follow the approach
employment policy autonomously.
taken in Age Concern England, and require national governments to determine, or
eliminate, a standard, employer-set retirement age only on the basis of an objective
and proportionate political process.189
The second reason is pragmatic. The social and economic circumstances of many
EU Member States during the last decade contrast sharply with the stable economic
growth and relatively healthy employment conditions of the United States during the

184
15

86

1

See Charter art. 25.
See EDWARD & LANE, supra note 5, 7.05-09; GOEBEL ET AL., supra note 9, at 153-54.
TFEU, art. 149. See CATHERINE BARNARD, E.U. EMPLOYMENT LAW, 91-94 (4th ed. 2012).
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Palacios de la Villa, EU:C:2007:106; Age Concern England, EU:C:2009:128; Rosenbladt,
EU:C:2010:601.
189 Palacios de la Villa, EU:C:2007:106; Age Concern England, EU:C:2009:128.
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1967-86 evolution of the ADEA. 1 90 The concern for an inter-generational approach in
setting national employment policy, especially the fostering of the employment of
younger workers when their unemployment rates are particularly high, would appear
to justify those Member States that have adopted a policy of authorizing or endorsing
standard, compulsory retirement ages.191 When the national social partners urge or
approve such a policy, its justification is undeniably reinforced.
Accordingly, there is no reason to consider that the U.S. experience in progressing
from a standard compulsory retirement age of sixty-five in 1967 to a total elimination
of compulsory retirement in 1986 should provide a basis for serious criticism of the
Court's view that Member States should have "broad discretion" in setting an
employment policy which endorses a compulsory retirement age.
E. The FutureImpact of the DemographicEvolution of the EU
This Part can appropriately end with a glimpse of the future. The progressive
demographic evolution of Member States raises a crucial question concerning the
proportionality of any age selected by a Member State for its standard retirement age.
Justice Blake's detailed opinion in the High Court proceeding reviewing the U.K.'s
standard retirement age ultimately concluded that setting the age at sixty-five was not
a proportionate determination in view of longer life expectancies and the U.K.'s
consequent gradual raising of its age of eligibility for state pensions. Unquestionably
the Member States must confront the challenge of an increasing proportion of older
people in the total population, due to the steady progress of longevity, which occasions
a consequent growing burden on the national retirement pension funds. Plausibly the
Court of Justice ought to take this vital factor into consideration in its judicial review
of standard compulsory retirement ages, just as Justice Blake did.
In 2004, the Commission issued an influential Communication, "Increasing the
1 92
Employment of Older Workers and Delaying the Exit from the Labour Market,"
which is still highly relevant. The Communication commences by declaring that a
"sustained growth in longevity means that people have greater opportunities to fulfil
their potential over a longer life-span." 1 9 3 This has great economic importance because
it is "crucial [to use] the full potential of labour supply to sustain economic growth,
tax revenues and social protection systems, including adequate pensions, in the face
of expected reductions in the population of working age." 1 94 The Communication
urged that "Member States must take drastic action" in order to sustain the
employment of older workers, including the use of financial incentives, promotion of
"good working conditions conducive to job retention,... flexible working

190 The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics indicates that the average U.S. unemployment rates in 1967,
1978 and 1986 were 3.8%, 6.1% and 7% respectively. Databases, Tables & Calculatorsby Subject, U.S.
Dep't
of
Labor,
Bureau
of
Labor
Stat.,
https:/data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNU04000000?years option=allyears&periods option=specific_periods
&periods=Annual+Data
191 See supra text accompanying notes 69, and 127-130.
192

Commission Communication for Increasing the Employment of Older Workers and Delaying the

Exit from the LabourMarket COM (2004) 146 final (Feb. 18, 2005).
193 Id. at 3.
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arrangements," 1 95 etc. The Communication cited the "[r]ecognition of demographic
changes and the need to preserve skills and experience" which warranted
governmental action to remove incentives for early retirement, and to provide higher
pension entitlements for people to stay in work longer, together with the adoption of
flexible retirement schemes combining gradual retirement with part-time work.196 The
Communication later declared that "[t]he low employment of older workers in Europe
197
represents a waste of individuals life opportunities and societal potential."
The Commission Communication's principal concern was that the average age at
which older workers left the labor force was 60.4 in 2001 and 60.8 in 2002.198
Accordingly, its proposals centered on taking measures to delay this early "exit" of
older workers. The Communication made no reference to any modification in the
national standard retirement ages, but its comments would seem to point in the
direction of raising national standard retirement ages.
Since 2009, the Commission has published periodically an extensive report
prepared by experts on the future demographic, economic, and budgetary evolution of
the EU. The most recent is the 2015 Ageing Report,1 99 almost 400 pages of text and
annexes. Its conclusions are sobering. The Report's Executive Summary projects that
the proportion of people aged under sixty-five to those over sixty-five will steadily
decline from the present four working age persons (aged fifteen to sixty-four) to one
over sixty-five, down to only two working age persons to one over sixty-five in
2060.200 Naturally, this will result in a steady increase in public spending due to the
aging population, notably for old age pensions and health care.
After reviewing the 2015 Ageing Report, the Council adopted "Conclusions on
the Sustainability of Public Finances in Light ofAgeing Populations," which affirmed
the need for States to undertake "pension, health and long-term care reforms," and
specifically "to raise the effective retirement age . . . by avoiding early exit from the
labour market and by linking the retirement age or pension benefits to life
expectancy."201 The U.K. government's decision in 2011 to abandon the policy of
setting a standard retirement age upon which employers could rely may be the
forerunner of similar action in other Member States. Recognition of the demographic
impact of longer life expectancies, with an inevitable increase in the number of retired,
older people as compared to that of the working population, clearly points in the
direction of raising any standard retirement age, or perhaps even to eliminating it
altogether.
Admittedly, this demographic factor may be balanced by a government's concern
for high unemployment among younger individuals in the work force (usually based
195

Id. at 3-4.
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Id. at 4.
97
1 Id. at 5.
1

198 Id. at 7. An annexed Table 2 indicated that in 2002 the average exit rate from the labor force in the
then fifteen Member States ranged from 58.5 years in Belgium up to 63.2 years in Sweden. Id. at 19.
199 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, The 2015 Ageing Report: Economic and Budgetary Projectionsfor the

28E.U. Member States (2013-2060), 3 EUR.ECON. (2015).
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on the unemployment rate of persons under twenty-five), which is certainly a major
concern in many EU States at the present time. Nonetheless, inasmuch as most older
employees voluntarily choose to retire at the age at which they are eligible for state
old-age pensions, or even earlier, it seems unlikely that raising a State's endorsed,
employer-set compulsory retirement age would retain a large number of older
employees in the workforce or create a substantial barrier to hiring young employees.
For States that currently endorse a compulsory retirement age of sixty-five, sixtyseven, or sixty-eight, it is likely to be more politically feasible to raise the State's
endorsement of any employer-set compulsory retirement age to seventy, as Denmark
did in 2008202 (and as the U.S. Congress did in 1978), than to provide for the outright
elimination of any standard retirement age.
The Court of Justice may well receive in the future questions from a national court
concerning the justification of a State-authorized or endorsed standard retirement age.
In view of the Court of Justice's well-established judicial deference to fundamental
State social or employment policy determinations, the Court itself will certainly not
hold that a State-endorsed standard retirement age is not justified under the Directive's
Article 6. Nonetheless, it may be hoped that the Court would follow the approach of
the Third Chamber in Age Concern England, informing the national court that it
should not accept "mere generalizations" in support of the State's policy, but should
203
assess carefully whether the State-endorsed standard age is presently appropriate.
As we have seen, this enabled Justice Blake to carry out his careful review in the U.K.
High Court proceedings that ultimately led to the U.K. government's elimination of
its endorsement of a standard retirement age.
The steady increase in the proportion of older people in the overall population
may motivate Member States that currently authorize or endorse a standard retirement
age to seriously consider retarding that age to seventy, as the United States did in
1978,204 even if eliminating a standard retirement age altogether is still a bridge too
far.
III. IS A COMPULSORY RETIREMENT AGE, OR ANOTHER AGE-BASED
LIMIT ON SERVICE, PERMISSIBLE FOR A SPECIFIC PROFESSION OR
FIELD OF EMPLOYMENT?
Not surprisingly, national, regional and local governments of Member States often
set a compulsory retirement age, or some other form of age limit on service, with
regard to certain professions or fields of employment. The motive is often based upon
a concern that older individuals engaged in the profession or field may no longer be
able to fulfill particularly high physical and mental requirements in order to ensure
public health or security, or upon a policy view that there should be an appropriate
inter-generational mix of persons engaged in the profession or fields, or both.
Governments may also set maximum age limits for entry into a particular profession,
or promotion within it.

202 Consolidation Act on Prohibition of Discrimination on the Labour Market, No. 1349, Dec. 16,2008

(Den.).
203

Age Concern England, EU:C:2009:128, ¶ 48.

204 See discussion supra at note 167.
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Questions referred by national courts concerning these rules have raised novel
issues for the Court of Justice in its application of provisions of Directive 2000/78.
The Court judgments are obviously less consequential than those reviewed in Part II,
but still have considerable importance.
A. Judgments Concerning the OccupationalActivities Exception ofArticle 4(1)
1. Review of Prigge v. Deutsche Lufthansa205

In this part of the article, we encounter for the first time a new issue: whether a
state regulation can be considered not to be discriminatory at all pursuant to the
Directive's Article 4(1). That Article states that differential treatment in employment
shall not be considered discriminatory at all when, "by reason of the nature of the
particular occupational activities concerned or of the context in which they are carried
out [the differential treatment is justified by] a genuine and determining occupational
requirement."2 06 Article 4(1) parallels the BFOQ exception of the ADEA, noted in Part
II.D above. When Article 4(1) is relevant in a case presented to the Court, determining
whether State rules can be considered not to discriminate at all should precede any
examination of whether the State rules, although discriminatory, can be justified
pursuant to Article 6(1).
The Grand Chamber's September 2011 judgment in Priggev. Deutsche Lufthansa
is the only one that directly concerns compulsory retirement. The Court invalidated a
rule requiring commercial air pilots to retire at age sixty.
Two other Court judgments concerned rules that set age limits for service in a
profession. In January 2010, in Wolf v. Stadt Frankfurt am Main,207 the Grand
Chamber accepted government rules which set a maximum age after which firefighters
could not commence service in an intermediate career level. Subsequently, the Second
Chamber's 2014 judgment in Vital Perez208 invalidated another age-based limitation
on service: a condition that candidates for entry into a local police force could not be
older than thirty. Because neither judgment concerns compulsory retirement rules,
they are reviewed in Part III.C among other judgments that parallel or contrast with
U.S. court cases concerning the ADEA.
In Prigge v. Deutsche Lufthansa,209 Prigge and other pilots were compulsorily
retired at the age of sixty by their employer, the German airline Lufthansa. Lufthansa
acted pursuant to a 2005 Collective Agreement governing the employment conditions
for its flight crews that required pilots to retire at age sixty.210 However, in 2003
Germany had accepted the international rules on air transport set by a multinational
cooperative body, the Joint Aviation Authorities, 211 whose rules included a 2003
provision concerning flight crews that required the "curtailment" of a pilot's
205

Prigge v. Deutsche Lufthansa, Case C-447/09, EU:C:2011:573.

206 Council Directive 2000/78, supra note 4, art.
4(1).

Wolf v. Stadt Frankfurt am Main, Case C-229/08, EU:C:2010:3.
208 Vital Perez v. Ayuntamiento de Oviedo, Case C-416/13, EU:C:2014:2371.
2 09
Prigge, EU:C:2011:573.
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employment in "commercial air transport operations"212 at sixty, but only required
retirement at age sixty-five.213 The principal limitation set by the Joint Aviation
Authorities rules upon the activities of pilots aged sixty to sixty-four was to require
214
that they only act as a member of a multi-pilot crew.
Prigge lost his challenge to his
dismissal at age sixty in lower courts. When he appealed to the German Supreme
Labor Court, that court was clearly inclined to affirm, taking the view that a pilot's
diminishing physical capacity with advancing age presented a definite risk to the "life
and health of crew members, passengers and persons in the areas over which aircraft
fly." 2 15 The Supreme Labor Court nonetheless decided to refer questions to the Court
of Justice.
The Grand Chamber commenced its judgment by observing that "nondiscrimination on grounds of age" constituted a "general principle of E.U. law," 2 1 6 and
is specifically referenced in Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which
acquired Treaty force when the Treaty of Lisbon went into effect on November 1,
2009.217 The Court easily concluded that compulsory retirement at age 60 constituted
218
The Grand Chamber also held that a
direct discrimination on the basis of age.
collective agreement could not compel discrimination based on age any more than a
national law or regulation could.2 19
Noting that Directive 2000/78's Article 2(5) expressly declared that appropriate
measures to protect health and public security are permissible, the Court then
concluded, not surprisingly, that "measures that aim to avoid aeronautical accidents
by monitoring pilots' aptitude and physical capacities" do aim at achieving public
security.220 Nonetheless, in view of the fact that the Joint Aviation Authorities rules
only curtailed pilots' activities between sixty and sixty-five, the Court held that
compulsory retirement at age sixty was not proportionate to the goal of achieving
public security, pursuant to Article 2(5).221
With regard to the application of the Directive's Article 4(1), the Grand Chamber
222
considered it "undeniable" that pilots' physical capacities diminish with age.
However, the Court held that as a derogation from the principle of non-discrimination,
223
Article 4(1) is to be strictly construed2.
The Grand Chamber specifically cited

212 Id. See Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalon, Reinhard Prigge v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG,
EU:C:2011:321,1 14 ("Commercial air transport operations" involves the transport of passengers, mail or
freight).
213
21 Prigge, EU:C:2011:573, T 14.
4 Id.

Id. ¶ 28.
See Kucukdevici v. Swedex, Case C-555/07, EU:C:2010:21 (citing Mangold, EU:C:2005:709).
217 See Charter, art. 21; de Burca, supra note 22; and THE
CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: A
215

216

COMMENTARY supra note 22.
21

8

219

Prigge, EU:C:2011:573, ¶¶44-45.
Id. ¶¶ 47-49.

22 0

Id.

221

Id.

Id.

¶ 58.
¶ 63.

67.
72 (citing two judgments applying this strict scrutiny approach in the context of sex-based
discrimination in employment, Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, Case C222/84, EU:C:1986:206 and Sirdar v. The Army Board, Case C-273/97, EU:C:1999:523).
222
223 Id.

¶
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Directive 2000/78's Recital 23, which states that a difference in treatment based on
age should occur only in "limited circumstances" when a "characteristic related . . . to
age constitutes a genuine and determining occupational requirement." 2 2 4 In view of
the international rules' sanction for pilots to carry out their activities on a curtailed
basis between sixty and sixty-five, the Court held that compulsory retirement at sixty
is not authorized by Article 4(1).225
Although Part III.C provides illustrations of the U.S. approach to the compulsory
retirement of employees in specific professions or types of employment, it is worth
noting immediately that specific U.S. legislation adopted in 2007 prohibited
employers of commercial airlines from requiring mandatory retirement of pilots
before the age of sixty-five.226
2. Reflections on Prigge'sApplication of Directive Article 4(1)
The novel issues that the Grand Chamber confronted in Prigge center on Article
4(1) of Directive 2000/78, which enables State regulations to be considered not to be
discriminatory at all, when the rules are appropriate "by reason of the nature of the
particular occupational activities concerned," and are based upon a "genuine and
determining occupational requirement."2 2 7
The Grand Chamber's most important doctrinal conclusion was that Article 4(1)
should be strictly construed as a derogation from the fundamental principle of nondiscrimination in employment on the basis of age whenever a State claims Article 4(1)
228
to justify a specific compulsory retirement or maximum service age. The Court and
Advocate General Cruz Villalon emphasized that Recital 23, which commented on
Article 4(1), began with the caveat, "in very limited circumstances," indicating that
229
the Article's application should be relatively rare.
Long-standing precedents applying the analogous Article 1(2) of Directive 76/207
in equal treatment for men and women in employment take the same view,
emphasizing that sex-based discrimination in employment should be permitted only
rarely when a government alleges that it is justified by a "genuine and determining
occupational requirement." 2 3 0 Unquestionably, pilots' ability to fly safely is essential
to protect public security, one of the public interests specified in the Directive's Article
2(5).231 This public interest factor makes more sensitive the issue of determining when
the average pilot's gradually diminishing physical capacity should properly lead to the
setting of a specific maximum age after which a pilot should no longer be engaged in

¶ 71. See Advocate General Cruz Villalon's emphasis on this at ¶¶ 60-61 of his Opinion.
Prigge, EU:C:2011:573, ¶T 74-77. See Op. Advoc. Gen., Prigge, EU:C:2011:321, ¶T 65-68.
226 The Fair Treatment for Experienced Pilots
Act, 49 U.S.C § 44729 (2012).
227 Council Directive 2000/78, supra note 4, art.
4(1).
224 Id.
2 25

228

Prigge, EU:C:2011:573, ¶72.
Id. ¶ 71; See also Op. Advoc. Gen., Prigge, EU:C:2011:321, ¶ 60.
230 See Johnston v. Royal Ulster Constabulary, Case C-222/84, EU:C:1986:206 (the Constabulary can
restrict the employment of women in its armed police force based on public safety concerns); Kreil v.
Germany, Case C-285/98, EU:C:2000:2 (the German army cannot exclude women from military service
that involved the use of arms).
231 Council Directive 2000/78, supra note 4, art. 4(1).
229
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commercial air transport.
Because it is "undeniable" that pilots' capacities diminish with age, the Grand
Chamber might have simply deferred to the German rule mandating an end to pilots'
commercial air transport service at sixty.232 Instead the Grand Chamber exercised a
strict scrutiny approach, and held that the maximum service age for pilots should be
sixty-five, not sixty, relying on the Joint Aviation Authorities' acceptance of that
retirement age, together with the imposition of certain limitations on a pilot's
operational service between sixty and sixty-four.233
The Court's strict scrutiny approach to the application of Article 4(1) is to be
applauded. The Article's language, permitting its application only for a "genuine and
determining occupational requirement," suggests the need for strict scrutiny, and
Recital 23's limitation of Article 4(1)'s use to "very limited circumstances" is a clear234
cut admonition.
B. Court Judgments Concerning the JustificationProvisionsofArticle 6(1)
1. Review of Petersen, Georgiev, and Fuchs and Kohler
We turn now to the judgments centered on the Directive's Article 6(1) on possible
justifications for age-based discrimination in employment. The Grand Chamber
decided the first, Petersen v. Berufungsausschusfur Zahnarzte, in January 2010.235
In addition to Petersen, three five-judge Chambers issued judgments centered on
the justification provisions of Article 6(1) of Directive 2000/78: Georgiev,236 Fuchs
andKohler,237 and Commission v. Hungary.238All merit careful examination, because
they deal with issues considerably more consequential than those involved in
Petersen.
In Petersen, the Dortmund Social Court referred several questions to the Court of
Justice concerning Article 6(1). The Grand Chamber examined a German regulation
within its statutory health insurance scheme that set sixty-eight as the maximum age
for a dentist (or doctor) engaged in providing insurance-reimbursed services to
patients (such dentists being referred to as panel dentists). A dentist, Mrs. Petersen,
challenged the rule, which obviously constituted direct discrimination based on age.
Mrs. Petersen was not an employee, but claimed that the age limitation severely
restricted her ability to practice her occupational profession, inasmuch as only ten
239
percent of potential patients were not covered by health insurance2.
The judgment is
a rare example of the effect of including the exercise of an "occupation" along with
employment in the Directive's Article 1 on its scope. Conceivably, the sixty-eight-year
22As we saw in Palaciosde la 1ia and other judgments reviewed in Part II, the Court tends to follow
a policy of great deference to national rules in the sector of employment.
233
Prigge, EU:C:2011:573, ¶T 73-76.
234 Council Directive 2000/78, supra note 4, art. 4(1).
235 Petersen v. Berufungsausschuss flir Zahnarzte, Case C-341/08, EU:C:2010:4.
236 Georgiev v. Tehnicheski Universitet-Sofia, Joined Cases
C-250/09 & C-268/09, EU:C:2010:699.
237 Fuchs & K6hler v. Land Hessen, Joined Cases C-159/10
& C-160/10, EU:C:2011:508.
238 Comm'n v. Hungary, Case C-286/12, EU:C:2012:687.
239 Petersen, EU:C:2010:4, ¶ 33.
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age limit is tantamount to compulsory retirement, if Mrs. Petersen can no longer
240
provide services to enough patients to make it worthwhile to continue in practice.
The Court's judgment suggested strongly that the German health insurance
reimbursement rule might be questionable, but left the ultimate determination to the
Social Court.
Germany contended that its age limit could be justified for the protection of public
health, a justification expressly authorized in the Directive's Article 2(5). Although the
Court accepted that Germany could set an appropriate maximum age limit for dentists,
it then reached the rather obvious conclusion that the age limit for panel dentists could
not protect public health directly, because it had no relation to assuring the professional
competence of dentists, who were in no way barred from providing services to private
241
patients2.
The Court did accept, in principle, the German government's contention
that an excessive supply ofpanel dentists might occasion excessive public health costs,
which is not surprising in view of the Court's customary deference towards a
government's determination of the proper organization of its medical services and
social security system.242 As a general rule, the Court of Justice does not accept that
financial, economic, or administrative considerations can justify a government's
243
limitation on Treaty-based rights, but it has recognized an exception in the sector of
public health care when the limitation is essential to avert "the risk of serious harm to
the financial balance of the social security system." 2 44 As usual, the Court of Justice
left it to the referring court to determine whether Germany's concern was justified.
The Grand Chamber then turned to the second possible justification for the age
limit-one accepted by the German Federal Social Court-that such age limits for
practice enabled a "balanced sharing ... between the generations" and facilitated
"employment opportunities of young panel dentists."2 46 Again, the Court accepted this
rationale in principle,247 but left the referring court with the task of determining
whether in this instance it was justifiable, observing that if there are not an excessively

240 Advocate General Bot observed that inability to serve ninety percent of potential patients might
make it unprofitable for a dentist to continue practicing. See Opinion ofAdvocate General Bot, Petersen v.
Berufungsausschuss far Zahnarzte, Case C-341/08, EU:C:2009:513, ¶ 36.
241 Petersen, EU:C:2010:4, ¶ 61. The Court implicitly rejected the view of the German
Federal

Constitutional Court, which had held in 2007 that the age limit might be justified to protect against risks
posed by older panel dentists whose capacity might have deteriorated. Id. ¶ 23.
242
Id. ¶¶ 51-53, 63.
243 See, e.g., Comm'n v. France, Case C-265/95, EU:C:1997:595, ¶ 62 (stating that France's economic
concerns do not justify barriers to imports of produce from Spain); Comm'n v. Ireland, Case C-39/88,
EU:C: 1990:430 (rejecting Ireland's claim that administrative costs justified its failure to comply with a
fisheries regulation).
244 Petersen, EU:C:2010:4, ¶¶ 45, 51-52, 63. See Op. Advoc. Gen., Petersen, EU:C:2009:513, ¶¶ 5259. See also Watts v. Bedford Primary Care Trust, Case C-372/04, EU:C:2006:325 (citing a prominent
judgment authorizing national rules intended to control hospital costs in order to safeguard the social
security health insurance system).
245 Petersen, EU:C:2010:4, ¶¶ 42, 64. It would seem highly unlikely that even reimbursing the total
annual bills of a few panel dentists over the age of 65 could present a "risk of serious harm to the financial
balance of the social security system."
246 Id. ¶¶
22, 65.
247 Id. ¶ 70. See Op. Advoc. Gen., Petersen,
EU:C:2009:513, TT 69-74.
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large number of panel dentists, young practitioners should be able to enter the field.248
We turn now to Georgiev,249 a 2010 Second Chamber judgment likely to be of
particular interest to academics and students. The principal issue was whether a
Bulgarian state university could require the compulsory retirement of professors at age
sixty-five, based upon the justification provisions ofArticle 6(1) of Directive 2000/78.
Advocate General Yves Bot's Opinion strongly influenced the Court.
After teaching as a Lecturer at the Sofia Technical University since 1985,
Georgiev was retired at age sixty-five in 2006. The University then granted him three
successive one year contracts until 2009, and promoted him to Professor in 2007.
When Georgiev sued to contest both his initial retirement at age sixty-five, and the
cessation of the annual contracts at age sixty-eight, the Bulgarian court essentially
asked the Court of Justice whether both could be justified pursuant to Article 6(1).
Note that although the Court's judgment only concerned the retirement rules of a state
university, there is no reason to consider that the Court's conclusions would not be
applied likewise to mandatory retirement rules of a private university. Neither Bulgaria
nor the University clearly specified any legitimate aim intended to be achieved by the
compulsory termination of Georgiev's employment, rather vaguely citing social policy
and labor market policy. 250 However, the Commission, Germany and Slovakia
provided interventions which suggested that the "employment of younger professors"
could be a justification. 251 The Second Chamber agreed, concluding that the
"encouragement of recruitment in higher education by [providing] posts as professors
252
to younger people" may constitute a legitimate aim.
More importantly, in terms of
doctrinal development, the Second Chamber followed the suggestion of Advocate
General Bot and held that "the mix of different generations of teaching staff and
researchers is such as to promote an exchange of experiences and innovation and
253
thereby the development of the quality of teaching and research at universities."
Georgiev had contended that the University and Bulgaria had merely made
"assertions" unsupported by the "reality of the [university] labor market" where not
254
The Second Chamber
many young people were interested in a career in teaching.
took this contention seriously enough that it instructed the national court to examine
it,255 but later observed that in principle the limited number of university professors
and the customary university policy of filling vacant posts only with "people who have
attained the highest qualifications" made it appropriate for a State to set a compulsory
256
retirement age for professors in order to make room for younger ones. The Second
Chamber also concluded that the University's grant of three annual teaching contracts

248
249

250

Petersen, EU:C:2010:4, ¶¶ 71, 77.
Georgiev, EU:C:2010:699.

Id.

Id.
252 Id.
251

¶¶ 41, 43.
¶ 42.
¶ 45 (citing Palaciosde la

1ia, EU:C:2007:604, ¶ 65). See also Opinion of Advocate General
Bot, Georgiev v. Tehnicheski Universitet-Sofia, Joined Cases C-250/09 & C-268/09, EU:C:2010:487, ¶
31.
253 Georgiev, EU:C:2010:699, ¶ 46. See Op. Advoc.
Gen., Georgiev, EU:C:2010:487, ¶ 34.
254 Georgiev, EU:C:2010:699,
¶ 47.
255 Id.
48.
256 Id. ¶ 52. See Op. Advoc. Gen., Georgiev,
EU:C:2010:487, ¶ 34.
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to Georgiev did not cast any doubt on the appropriate nature of compulsory retirement
at sixty-five. As Advocate General Bot observed, the annual contracts only achieved
257
greater occupational flexibility to the benefit of both the university and professors.
Finally, as in Palaciosde la Villa,258 the Court considered that the retired professors'
access to "financial compensation by way of a retirement pension at the end of their
working life" meant that they were not economically prejudiced by the compulsory
retirement age,259 noting that Bulgaria's right to a state old age pension commences at
age sixty-three.
The Second Chamber's 2011 judgment in Fuchs and Kohler,260 issued shortly
after its judgment in Georgiev, did not contain any significant doctrinal developments,
but may well have a practical impact on state civil service employment in general. The
specific issue addressed was whether the German state of Hessen could require its
permanent civil servants (including the plaintiff prosecutors) to retire at sixty-five, but
the judgment's conclusions could be applied analogously to the German federal
government rules that require the compulsory retirement of all German Government
civil servants at age sixty-seven.
A 2008 German federal law required the civil servants of its federal states to retire
on attaining a retirement age which would be set by each state for its civil servants.
Hessen set the age at sixty-five, although authorizing responsible administrators to
postpone retirement until sixty-eight through successive annual arrangements. Fuchs
and a colleague, Kohler, were retired at sixty-five in 2009, but permitted to serve as
prosecutors one further year.
When Fuchs and Kohler sued to challenge their retirement, the Frankfurt
administrative court considered that the compulsory retirement constituted unjustified
age discrimination based on a stereotype view that older employees have a declining
"fitness for work." 261 The Frankfurt court observed that Hessen's compulsory
retirement of its civil servants at sixty-five contrasted with the German federal
legislation, which set sixty-seven as the retirement age for civil servants of the federal
262
government, and delayed their entitlement to pensions until the age of sixty0seven.
Accordingly, the Frankfurt court queried Hessen's adoption of sixty-five as its
standard retirement age in several questions referred to the Court of Justice.
Because compulsory retirement constitutes direct discrimination based on age,
the Second Chamber concentrated on whether the retirement age could be justified
under the Directive's Article 6(1). Both Hessen and Germany accepted that the original
justification of Hessen's retirement age, a presumption that persons over the age of
263
sixty-five were no longer fit at all for work, was untenable.
The principal justification relied upon by Hessen, supported by Germany, was
See Op. Advoc. Gen., Georgiev, EU:C:2010:487, ¶ 40.
Palacios de la Villa, EU:C:2007:604, ¶ 73.
259 Georgiev, EU:C:2010:699, ¶ 54. See Op. Advoc.
Gen., Georgiev, EU:C:2010:487, ¶ 36.
260 Fuchs & Kohler, EU:C:2011:508. Somewhat surprisingly, there is no Opinion of
an Advocate
General.
261 Id. ¶
24.
262 Id.
263 Id. ¶
40.
257
258
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that retirement at age sixty-five was intended to achieve a "favorable age structure,"
with a "balance between the generations," and the encouragement of "the recruitment
and promotion of young people." 264 Citing Georgiev, which the Second Chamber had
decided only a few months previously, the Second Chamber endorsed both the
"promotion of access of young people" and "the mix of different generations" as valid
justifications in order to achieve a "high-quality justice service." 2 65
The Second Chamber also endorsed Germany's authorization for each federal
state to set the retirement age for its own civil servants as a flexible approach that
better adapted the retirement age to the circumstances in that state, citing Palaciosde
la Villa.

26 6

With regard specifically to the profession of prosecutors, the Court observed that
their number is limited at senior levels, particularly in view of "budgetary constraints,"
because they are "appointed permanently and only rarely resign," so that setting a
compulsory retirement age is essential to achieve a fair inter-generational
267
distribution.
Although the Second Chamber observed that "keeping older workers in the labour
force promotes diversity in the work force," citing Recital 25 of Council Directive
2000/78, it then concluded that this could be balanced by the interest of promoting
"the entry of young workers into the labour force." 2 68
Ever since Palacios de la Villa, the Court has linked the determination of a
compulsory retirement age to the date of access to pensions at a not "unreasonable"
level. In Fuchs, the Second Chamber noted that prosecutors usually retire with a
269
pension equivalent to seventy-two percent of their prior salary.
Moreover, the Court
observed that prosecutors could still engage in private legal practice, 270 presumably
either as independent legal practitioners or as members of a law firm.
2. Reflections on Petersen, Georgiev, and Fuchs and Kohler
We previously noted in Palaciosde la Villa and other judgments in Part IIA-C
that the Court of Justice accorded almost total deference to the Member State
governments when the Court had occasion to examine Member State rules that
authorized or endorsed employer-set standard retirement ages on a national basis.
The Court was obviously motivated by the view that Member State governments,
not courts, should set fundamental social and employment policies. The Court
presumably considered that the issue of whether standard retirement ages (usually

264

Id.

265 Id.

53.

¶¶
¶¶

47-48.
49-50. The Court later described a "high-quality justice service" as a "public interest." Id.

¶

Fuchs & Kohler, EU:C:2011:508, ¶¶ 54-56, 65.
¶ 57. The Court later held that Hessen could properly consider budgetary factors, as well as
political, social or demographic concerns, in determining its employment policies, provided that they
continue to "observe the general principle of the prohibition of age discrimination." Id. ¶ 73.
268 Id. ¶¶
63-64.
269 Id. T 67.
266

267 Id.

270 Id
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sixty-five, sixty-seven, or sixty-eight) should be set or endorsed at all, was best
resolved through the political process in each Member State. In its key judgment,
Palacios de la Villa, the Court emphasized that this could lead to considerable
diversity among the States (as indeed it has) due to political, economic, social,
271
demographic, and budgetary factors specific to each State.
In contrast, when the Court has had occasion in its judgments since 2010 to
examine State rules setting or endorsing maximum ages for the exercise of specific
professions or sectors of employment, the Court may have felt that it had greater
latitude, because these State rules encompass a limited number of individuals, not the
entire employed population. In some judgments applying the justification provisions
of Directive 2000/78's Article 6(1), the Court has continued to show considerable
deference towards State political determinations, while in others the Court has
exercised the strict scrutiny appropriate for rules that derogate from the fundamental
principle of non-discrimination based on age.
In its 2010 judgment in Petersen, the Grand Chamber exhibited considerable
skepticism toward Germany's justifications for setting sixty-eight as the final year for
a dentist's occupation as a panel dentist entitled to provide services to patients that the
272
state insurance system would reimburse2.
The skepticism was certainly warranted.
Thus, early in its judgment, the Court concluded that a public health concern could not
justify the sixty-eight-year limit for panel dentist service, because dentists were
273
permitted to continue to serve private patients after reaching that age.
The Grand Chamber did accept that Germany could justify the sixty-eight-year
limitation on panel dentists if necessary to "prevent a risk of serious harm to the
financial balance of the social security system," giving, as usual, the national court the
responsibility to "ascertain" whether such a risk would exist.274 However, it would
seem implausible that a national court could properly conclude that that risk existed,
inasmuch as the volume of dental services, and hence their total cost, would essentially
depend on patients' needs, not the number of panel dentists serving the patients.2 7 5
The Grand Chamber was also skeptical of Germany's contention that the sixtyeight-year maximum age for panel dentists was necessary to promote the employment
of younger dentists. Although the Court in Palacios de la Villa had held that the
encouragement of employment of younger employees is an appropriate State
justification for its employment policy,276 the Grand Chamber in Petersen considered
it unlikely that a sixty-eight-year maximum age limit was necessary to enable young
dentists to engage in that practice.277 Ultimately, it seems unlikely that the referring
court would accept the sixty-eight-year maximum service limit in view of the Court's
skeptical comments.

Palacios de la Villa, EU:C:2007:604, ¶ 69.
Petersen, EU:C:2010:4, ¶¶11-13.
273 Id. ¶ 61. See also Op. Advoc. Gen., Petersen, EU:C:2009:513,
274 Fuchs &Kohler,EU:C:2011:508,¶64.
275 Op. Advoc. Gen., Petersen, EU:C:2009:513,
¶¶ 59, 66.
276 Palacios de la Villa, EU:C:2007:604,
¶¶ 60, 65.
277 Petersen, EU:C:2010:4,
T71.
271

272

¶ 50.
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The Second Chamber's 2010 judgment in Georgiev 278 presents a stronger
doctrinal justification for a Member State rule or policy that compels mandatory
retirement of older persons in a particular profession, in this instance, that of university
professors. The Second Chamber endorsed the view of Advocate General Yves Bot
that a Member State may set an age limit in order to promote "a balanced mix of ages
... within the body of university professors" which will thereby enhance "the quality
of teaching and research at universities." 2 7 9
Although there is considerable variance in academic career structure and titles, in
essentially all Member States the academics engaged in university teaching and
research posts rise from low-level instructors through assistant professors, then
associate professors, ultimately to a relatively small group of full, or chaired,
professors. The academic career pattern thus takes a pyramid shape. It is also true that
higher level academic posts are invariably limited in number and are achieved through
high qualifications, whether achieved competitively, or by seniority.
There is good reason to endorse the Court's strong emphasis on the value of an
inter-generational mix, evident in a university context, but also applicable in other
professions or fields of employment. However, whether compulsory retirement at
sixty-five, or even sixty-eight, is appropriate in a modem university context is
certainly open to question.
In Commission v. Hungary,280 discussed below in Part II.B.3 as the sole Court
judgment concerning an infringement or violation of the Treaty, Advocate General
Juliane Kokott questioned the inter-generational mix doctrine. With reference to
judges and lawyers, the Advocate General cogently observed that "past experience and
the enhanced natural authority that often comes with age are of great practical use in
the legal profession." 2 8 1 One may quite plausibly contend that this should be true for
university professors as well.
Especially, in view of the modem demographic factor of a steady increase in
longevity with concomitant mental and physical capacity, should not professors be
permitted to serve at least until seventy? Arguably, the older professors aged sixty-five
to sixty-nine who opt to continue their service rather than retiring are apt to continue
contributing to academic research and writing in addition to teaching, providing in
each their accumulated experience and knowledge. Unless universities have unusually
serious budgetary problems, it would seem unlikely that permitting a few professors
to continue their service until the age of seventy would make it necessary to reduce
significantly the hiring of entry level academics.
Turning to Fuchs and Kohler, 282 the Second Chamber largely followed its prior
judgment in Georgiev with regard to the value provided by an inter-generational mix
in determining that a compulsory retirement age is justified, pursuant to Directive
2000/78's Article 6(1). What merits emphasis is that Hessen's compulsory retirement
age of sixty-five applied to all of its permanent civil servants, not just the prosecutors

278

Georgiev, EU:C:2010:699.
Op. Advoc. Gen., Georgiev, EU:C:2010:699,

¶ 46.
Comm'n v. Hungary, Case C-286/12, EU:C:2012:687.
281 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Comm'n v. Hungary, Case C-286/12, EU:C:2012:602,
282 Fuchs & Kohler, EU:C:2011:508.
279
280

¶ 52.
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concerned in the referring court's proceedings. Moreover, the Court's acceptance of
this inter-generational mix justification would analogously apply to Germany's
compulsory retirement of all of its permanent civil servants at sixty-seven (and
conceivably to any compulsory retirement age set for its civil servants by any other
Member State).
As just observed with regard to Georgiev, one may plausibly wonder whether
compulsory retirement at sixty-five or sixty-seven disregards the value provided by
older civil servants based upon their greater experience and "enhanced natural
authority," and whether it should still be considered appropriate today in view of the
demographic impact of greater longevity. Moving back compulsory retirement to,
perhaps, seventy would also enable some older civil servants to continue to pay
income taxes, offsetting to some degree the added budgetary costs of their
employment.
3. Commission v. Hungary:283 A Treaty Infringement Proceeding
Commission v. Hungary is unique among age discrimination cases. This First
Chamber judgment in 2012 is the sole instance of a Treaty infringement proceeding2 84
brought against a Member State for a deliberate violation of the principle of equal
treatment in Article 1 of Directive 2000/78. Indeed, the challenged Hungarian
legislation, which significantly lowered the compulsory retirement age for judges,
prosecutors, and notaries, was undoubtedly intended to achieve the political goals of
the government without regard for the principles of judicial independence and
285
democratic governance.
After Prime Minister Viktor Orban's Conservative Fidesz party obtained a twothird majority of the Hungarian parliament in 2010, his government began to adopt
measures which can plausibly be described as authoritarian. The government adopted
a new Basic Law or Constitution, effective in 2012. Its Articles 27(2) and 29(2)
specified that the government should appoint all professional judges and
286
prosecutors2.
Simultaneously, Parliament adopted a law that prescribed that all
judges, prosecutors, and notaries were subject to compulsory retirement at the age of
287
sixty-two, instead of the prior age of seventy.
The law had the immediate effect of
288
The Hungarian
requiring 194 judges and 79 prosecutors to retire on June 30, 20122.
283 Comm'n v. Hungary, EU:C:2012:687.
284 Ever since the creation of the European Economic Community in 1958, Treaty infringement
proceedings brought by the Commission against Member States in the Court of Justice have been a powerful
weapon to achieve compliance with Treaty provisions and secondary legislation. Article 169 of the initial
EEC Treaty, currently replicated in TFEU, art. 258, set out the procedure for the Commission's instigation
of an infringement action against a State, and stated that the Court's judgment was binding on the State. For
a description of Treaty infringement proceedings, see GOEBEL ET AL., supra note 9, ch. 3; ARNULL, supra
note 9, at 34-51; HARTLEY, supra note 9, ch.10.
285 See Uladzislau Belavusau, On Age Discrimination and Beating Dead Dogs: Commission v.
Hungary, 50 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1145, 1150-52 (2013).
286

MAGYARORSZAG ALAPTORVtNYE [THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF HUNGARY], ALAPTORVtNY, arts.

27(2) & 29(2); see also Belavusau, supra note 285 at 1146.
287 Commn v. Hungary, EU:C:2012:687,
¶¶ 1, 6-16.
288 Op. Advoc. Gen., Comm'n v. Hungary, EU:C:2012:602, ¶17. Moreover, thirty-seven judges and
twenty prosecutors were scheduled to retire on Dec. 31, 2012. Thus, about eight percent of all judges and
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Constitutional Court promptly held on July 16, 2012 that the reduction in the
retirement age of judges was unconstitutional as a violation of the principle of
irremovability of judges, an aspect of judicial independence, but this did not have the
289
effect of reinstating in office the retired judges2.
Moreover, the Constitutional Court
judgment did not make any reference to the lowered retirement age for prosecutors or
notaries, and accordingly had no application to them.
On June 7, 2012, the Commission filed its Treaty infringement proceeding against
Hungary pursuant to TFEU Article 258, and requested an accelerated Court procedure
290
The Court accepted the
pursuant to Article 133 of the Court Rules of Procedure2.
accelerated procedure request. Advocate General Juliane Kokott provided her Opinion
on October 2, 2012, and the First Chamber of five Judges issued its judgment on
November 6, 2012, largely agreeing with the views of the Advocate General.
An initial procedural issue raised by Hungary was whether the infringement
proceeding could be regarded as moot in view of its acceptance of the Hungarian
Constitutional Court judgment. The Court of Justice followed its traditional doctrine
that the treaty infringement proceeding was based upon the state of affairs in June
when the Commission sent Hungary a "reasoned opinion" challenging the alleged
291
infringement.
The First Chamber also observed that the Constitutional Court
judgment of July 16 did not reinstate the judges and prosecutors removed from office
on June 30, 2012, so that the government was able to replace them.2 9 2
On reaching the merits, the First Chamber easily held that the compulsory
retirement of judges, prosecutors and notaries constituted direct discrimination based
on age, citing Palaciosde la Villa.293 The Court then dealt with two issues: the possible
justification of the compulsory retirement pursuant to Directive 2000/78's Article 6(2),
and the proportionality of any measures considered to be conceivably justifiable.
The Court first examined Hungary's claim that the lowered compulsory
retirement age aligned the retirement of judges, prosecutors and notaries with that of
other civil servants, thus promoting the viability of the pension scheme. The First
294
Chamber accepted this as a possible justification,
but considered that the earlier
retirement at sixty-two instead of seventy was so significant and abrupt that it ought
295
to have been introduced with transitional measures2.
The law requiring earlier
six percent of all prosecutors might have been immediately replaced by the government. The Opinion also
notes that sixty-one notaries, out of a total of 315, were scheduled to retire on Dec. 31, 2013, pursuant to
the Hungarian legislation.
289 Alkotmanybir6sag (AB) [Constitutional Court] July 16, 2012, MK,VII.17 33/2012. See also
Belavusau, supra note 285, at 1146-47. The Constitutional Court decision was supported by eight judges
against seven dissents-the government had named seven judges in 2011-12. Id at 1151, 1153.
290 Rules ofProcedureof the Courtof-Justice of25 September 2012, art. 133, 2012 O.J (L 265) 1. The
President of the Court of Justice is authorized to issue an order of Expedited Procedure.
291 Comm'n v. Hungary, EU:C:2012:687, ¶ 41
292 Id. ¶¶ 46-47.
293 Id. ¶¶ 48-54.
294 Id. ¶ 61. Advocate General Kokott observed that making the retirement age of lawyers
and judges
"comparable with their professional counterparts elsewhere in the civil service" should be considered to be
within the discretion of the Member State government. Opinion of Advocate General, Kokott, Comm'n v.
Hungary, Case C-286/12, EU:C:2012:602, ¶ 63.
295 COmm'n v. Hungary, EU:C:2012:687, TT 66-71. See Op. Advoc.
Gen., Comm'n v. Hungary,
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retirement entered into effect on January 1, 2012 and immediately required the
retirement of large numbers of judges and prosecutors on June 1 and December 31,
2012.296 The abrupt character of the retirement age reduction meant that the retired
individuals would not have the opportunity to undertake economic or financial action
to try to reduce the impact of a reduction in income from their pay to their pension
297
levels, at least thirty percent lower.
The Court also noted that a different 2010
Hungarian law would raise the general retirement age of civil servants from sixty-two
to sixty-five between 2014 and 2022, but did so by means of a gradual shift over this
eight-year period. The Court noted that this alternative gradual approach showed that
Hungary could have, and indeed ought to have "gradually staggered" over time its
reduction of the retirement age of judges, prosecutors, and notaries.2 98
The First Chamber then turned to Hungary's second justification, that of
achieving "a more balanced age structure facilitating access for young lawyers."2 99
The Court had already accepted this as a plausible justification for setting a
compulsory retirement age for prosecutors in Fuchs, previously discussed, so the issue
to be examined was whether Hungary's abrupt and serious reduction in the compulsory
retirement age could be considered proportionate. The First Chamber accepted that the
resignation of so many senior judges, prosecutors, and notaries would provide
opportunities for young lawyers.
However, this would only achieve a positive shortterm effect, because after the immediate filling of the large number of posts of retired
individuals between sixty-two and seventy, the turnover replacement of retirees would
be significantly lower for several years.3 0 1 The Court concluded that this would not be
appropriate to achieving overall a "more balanced age structure," and did not satisfy
3 02
the principle of proportionality."
It should be emphasized that the First Chamber judgment did not cover two
significant reasons advanced by Advocate General Kokott for invalidating Hungary's
rules. She seriously questioned Hungary's claim that the earlier retirement age would
improve the quality of its justice system, observing that "lawyers can work effectively
until a relatively advanced age" and that "past experience and the enhanced natural
authority that often comes with age are of great practical use in the legal profession." 3 03

EU:C:2012:602, ¶¶ 65-68.
296 COmm'n v. Hungary, EU:C:2012:687,
¶ 69.
297 Id. ¶ 70. Op. Advoc. Gen., Comm'n v. Hungary, EU:C:2012:602, TT 77-89 (discussing at length the
obligation of States to avoid "undue adverse effects" on persons concerned by a reduction in the compulsory
retirement age (id. ¶ 77), noting that the retirees would not only have lower pension benefits instead of a
full salary (id. ¶ 83), but also would have difficulty in compensating for the lost income due to the abrupt
retirement (id. TT 85-88)).
298 Comm'n v. Hungary, EU:C:2012:687, ¶ 73.
299 Id. ¶
62.
.00 Id. ¶76. In fact, as Belavusau, supra note 285, at 1158 points out, the abrupt retirement of so many
judges, prosecutors and notaries affords replacement opportunities only for middle-aged lawyers, not young
lawyers.
301 Comm'n v. Hungary, EU:C:2012:687, ¶ 78.
302 Id. ¶ 79. Advocate General Kokott observed that "a balanced age structure can be achieved
. . more
efficiently if the new age limit is introduced progressively over a number of years." Op. Advoc. Gen.,
Comm'n v. Hungary, EU:C:2012:602, ¶ 46.
303 Op. Advoc. Gen., Comm'n v. Hungary, EU:C:2012:602, T 52.
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With specific reference to judges, the Advocate General pointed out that "their
abrupt forcing into retirement may give rise to doubts as to the independence.. .of the
courts," citing Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights on the obligation that
"courts must be independent and impartial and established by law." 3 04 Advocate
General Kokott considered that Hungary's abrupt removal of such a large number of
judges through their compulsory retirement constituted "a serious interference with
the justice system, not only because it might indicate an intent to "influence the course
of justice," but also because "any semblance of the exerting of influence must be
avoided." 3 05
4. Reflections on Commission v. Hungary
Commission v. Hungary presents issues that are completely unrelated to the
doctrinal ones examined in the prior judgments. The authoritarian government of
Prime Minister Orban undoubtedly sought the compulsory retirement of senior judges,
prosecutors and notaries at sixty-two instead of seventy not to promote a better intergenerational mix, nor to achieve budgetary savings, but to replace the retired judicial
officials with individuals more sympathetic to the government's political and
economic policies.
The First Chamber's judgment followed the Second Chamber's judgment in
Fuchs and Kohler, concluding that an inter-generational mix rationale, balancing
"young and older civil servants," could justify Hungary's lowering of the compulsory
retirement age.
Inasmuch as Fuchs and Kohler did not question setting sixty-five as
an appropriate retirement age for civil servants generally, and those concerned with
the administration of justice specifically, the First Chamber would have had difficulty
in contesting directly Hungary's reduction of its compulsory retirement age for judges,
prosecutors, and notaries from seventy to sixty-five (and perhaps even to sixty-two,
the age set in the 2010 Hungarian legislation). The First Chamber instead invalidated
the Hungarian reduction in the compulsory retirement age based upon a
proportionality analysis, holding that the age reduction was too abrupt and ought to
have been gradually phased in over a reasonable period of time. The abrupt nature of
the compulsory retirement at a significantly lower age-sixty-two versus seventyundeniably violated the legitimate expectations of any retired individuals, who were
thereby rendered incapable of taking measures over time to protect their economic
interests.3 07
Unfortunately, although the First Chamber judgment presumably prevented
Hungary's compulsory retirement of those judges and prosecutors scheduled to retire
on Dec. 31, 2013, the judgment neither required the reinstatement in office of those
retired on June 30, 2012, nor compelled any damages for their retirement. Moreover,
Prime Minister Orban's government has partially achieved its goal, because it was able
to replace a significant number of older judges and prosecutors with new ones apt to
be more favorable to Fidesz party views. Also highly unfortunate is the First
304

Id.

¶ 54.

Id. ¶ 56.
306 Comm'n v. Hungary, EU:C:2012:687,
¶ 62.
307
Id. TT 66-71.
305
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Chamber's failure to make any reference to the crucial importance of judicial
308

independence, highlighted by Advocate General Kokott in her Opinion.
This may
have been prompted by the Court's desire to obtain Hungary's compliance with the
judgment, but it is regrettable that such an obvious occasion was neglected to underline
the obligation of Member States to adhere to the democratic values and rule of law set
out in the Lisbon TEU's Article 2.309
It is worth noting that in a later 2014 Grand Chamber judgment in another Treaty
infringement proceeding, 310 the Court upheld the Commission contention that
Hungary had violated the independence of its national data protection authority as
required by a "complete independence" provision of Directive 95/46 on Personal Data
Protection. Manifestly, the government of Prime Minister Orban continues to be
authoritarian, and might well have benefitted from an explicit Court reminder in 2012
that the government ought to adhere to democratic values and the rule of law.
C.

Contrasts with U.S. Law-Specific Professions, Fields and Occupational
Roles

In Part II.D above, we reviewed the evolution of the ADEA from its initial 1967
text, which permitted employers to require the compulsory retirement of employees at
age sixty-five, through the 1978 amendment that retarded that age to seventy, and
down to the 1986 ADEA which essentially prohibited compulsory retirement. This
review enabled a comparison with the Court conclusion in Palacios de la Villa and
three other judgments that Member States could have objective justifications for their
compulsory retirement ages pursuant to the terms of Article 6 of Directive 2000/78.
The comparison ultimately concluded that substantially different legal, social and
economic conditions in the EU and the United States made the radically different
policies justifiable and appropriate. This conclusion did have a significant caveat,
discussed in Part IIE: the demographic impact of a steadily increasing proportion of
older persons in the EU's working population was apt to warrant a retarding of any
customary compulsory retirement age to seventy, and even its ultimate elimination.
In Part III, a comparative examination of EU and U.S. rules and court judgments
is also beneficial in enabling a better critical evaluation of each. When Congress
adopted the 1967 ADEA, it provided a general exception from the prohibition of agebased discrimination in employment "where age is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operations of the particular business,
or where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age." 3 1 1 An
acronym, BFOQ, is commonly used to indicate the "bona fide occupational
qualification" exception. The comparable provision in Directive 2000/78 is Article
4(1) on occupational requirements, which states that age-based differential treatment
in employment based on a factual characteristic "shall not constitute discrimination
where the characteristic constitutes a genuine and determining occupational

308

Op. Advoc. Gen., Comm'n v. Hungary, EU:C:2012:602, ¶¶ 54-56.

309

See TEU, art. 2.

310 Comm'n

v. Hungary, EU:C:2012:687.
311 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. 90-202, § 4(f), 81 Stat. 602 (1967)
(currently codified in 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)).
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requirement," proportionately applied.312
Enforcement of the ADEA by the EEOC, and civil suits by employees against
employers, have generated numerous cases in which the BFOQ has been applied.
In contrast, only three Court of Justice judgments have thus far examined the
application of the Directive's Article 4(1), each with regard to a quite specific
profession: commercial air pilots, firefighters, and police officers. The Grand
Chamber's 2011 judgment in Prigge,314 reviewed in Part III.A above, examined
Lufthansa's compulsory retirement rule that required its commercial air pilots to retire
at age sixty. The Grand Chamber did not challenge Lufthansa's power to compel
compulsory retirement for pilots, but concluded that the appropriate age should be
sixty-five because that was the age set by international rules on air transport, which
permitted pilots to serve in multi-pilot teams between the ages of sixty and sixtyfive.315
There can be no serious doubt that public safety concerns warrant an age limit for
316
pilots engaged in commercial air transportation.
But what should be that age? In
2007, the U.S. Congress adopted the Fair Treatment for Experienced Pilots Act, Public
Law 110-135,
which set sixty-five as the age limit for commercial air pilots,
provided they served in a multi-member flight deck crew. Congress acted when the
Federal Aviation Administration indicated that it was considering adopting that age
instead of the prior maximum age of sixty.
In view of the choice of sixty-five as the
appropriate age for the compulsory retirement of commercial air pilots both by the
U.S. Congress and by the Joint Aviation Authorities (as cited in Prigge), it would
appear sensible to accept that concern for public safety warrants that compulsory
retirement age, even though in other professions one might prefer the use of individual
physical and mental assessments to determine fitness for service, rather than a standard
retirement age.
Coincidentally, a good example of an analysis applying the "bona-fide
occupational qualification" exception is the Supreme Court's unanimous 1985
Western Airlines v. Criswell judgment,319 in which it invalidated Western Airlines'
compulsory retirement of flight engineers at the age of sixty. In Western Airlines'
large aircraft, flight engineers joined with the pilot and the co-pilot in a three-member
cabin crew. Justice Stevens' opinion emphasized that the ADEA applied "with especial
force [to] mandatory retirement provisions." 32 0 The Court held that, even though flight
engineers might provide critical assistance in emergency situations, Western Airlines

312 Council Directive 2000/78, supra note 4, art. 4(1).
313 See ESTREICHER & HARPER, supra note 159, at 431-38 (providing several illustrative U.S. court
judgments).
3 14
Prigge, EU:C:2011:573.
315 Id. ¶¶ 14, 73, 83.

31 6

Id. TT 58, 67.

Fair Treatment for Experienced Pilots Act, Pub. L. No. 110-135, 121 Stat. 1450 (2007) (enacted
H.R. 4343).
31 The Federal Aviation Administration prior age limit of sixty was set in 14 C.F.R. § 121. 383(c)
(2016).
319 Western Air Lines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985).
317

320

Id. at 410.
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had not demonstrated that its mandatory retirement age limit was "reasonably
321
necessary" for the safe transportation of airline passengers,
or that substantially all
flight engineers over sixty could not perform their duties safely or efficiently.322 Thus,
unless Western Airlines could prove a safety risk, flight engineers could continue their
service until the age of seventy, the 1978 ADEA's then-authorized age for compulsory
retirement.
Turning from commercial air pilots to firefighters, the Grand Chamber's January
2010 judgment in Wolt2 3 concerned a regulation of the German state of Hessen that
governed the careers of persons employed in the professional firefighting service.324
The issues referred by an administrative court all concerned a significant age-based
service limitation: whether the Hessen regulation could bar a junior level firefighter
from applying for recruitment into an intermediate-level post after attaining the age of
thirty. Preventing junior firefighters thirty-years-old or older from progressing in their
careers might well induce some to leave the firefighting service, with the same
effective result as compulsory retirement. Note initially that although employment in
a professional firefighting service constitutes employment by a state agency, Directive
2000/78's Article 3(1) states that the Directive's scope covers "the public and private
sectors," making it applicable. 325
Although the administrative court's referred questions concerned the application
of the Directive's Article 6(1) on the possible justification for the rules, the Grand
Chamber took a different approach, reformulating the issues. 326 Following the
suggestion of Advocate General Yves Bot, 327 the Grand Chamber chose instead to
review the Hessen rules under Article 4(1). The Grand Chamber easily concluded that
firefighters must have a high physical capacity in order to ensure that the professional
firefighting service can "guarantee [its] operational capacity and proper
functioning," 328 citing the Directive's Recital 18, which included "emergency
services" among those forms of employment that could legitimately require a special
occupational capacity.329 The Grand Chamber also easily concluded that firefighters
at the intermediate service level who were actively involved in "fighting fires, rescuing
persons, environment protection tasks, helping animals, and dealing with dangerous
animals" needed "exceptionally high physical capabilities" which are rare after the
330
age of forty-five for firefighting, or after the age of fifty for rescuing persons.

321
322

Id. at 419.
Id. at 422-23.

Wolf, EU:C:2010:3.
Id. TT 17-20.
325 Council Directive 2000/78/EC, supra note 4,
art. 3(1).
326 The Court of Justice often reformulates questions referred by national courts in its role
of providing
"all the elements of interpretation of Community law which may be of assistance." Wolf, EU:C:2010:3, ¶
32.
327 Opinion of Advocate General Bot, Wolf v.
Stadt Frankfurt am Main, Case C-229/08,
EU:C:2009:509. Advocate General Bot has frequently provided Opinions in age discrimination cases.
328 Wolf, EU:C:2010:3, ¶¶ 37-39 (paralleling Advocate
General Bot's Opinion at ¶ 37).
329 Council Directive 2000/78/EC, supra
note 4, rec. 18.
330 Wolf, EU:C:2010:3, ¶¶ 40-41. The Court noted in ¶ 41 that firefighters could
continue to serve the
important role of"rescuing persons" up to the age of fifty. The German government provided the Court with
scientific data from industrial and sports medicine studies to justify the contention that "respiratory capacity,
323

324
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The crucial issue then became whether Hessen could bar anyone over thirty from
recruitment into the intermediate-level service based upon a "genuine and determining
occupational requirement." 3 3 1 The Court noted that firefighters older than fort-five or
fifty, who lacked the physical capacity to fight fires or rescue persons, performed
management and other functions3. 332 The Grand Chamber then accepted the German
government's contention that "the rational organization of the professional
[firefighting] service" required the maximum age limit of thirty for admission to the
intermediate level of service.333 Individuals recruited before the age of thirty into the
intermediate level could fulfill the crucial roles of firefighting or rescuing persons for
fifteen to twenty years before their diminished physical capacity would require them
to shift to management or other duties. Permitting individuals to join the intermediate
level at a later age would not allow them to serve for a "sufficiently long period." 3 3 4
Then, without giving any guidance on how many years would constitute a "sufficiently
long period," the Court simply accepted that setting a maximum age of thirty for
recruitment was proportionate to the goal of "ensuring the operational capacity" of the
professional firefighting service.
That firefighters require "exceptionally high physical capabilities" is
unquestionable. The Grand Chamber's acceptance of Germany's contention that
individuals over forty-five are unlikely to possess those capabilities for service as
firefighters is, however, open to question. The Grand Chamber cited the German
government's contention that persons past the age of forty-five (for firefighters) to
fifty (for saving persons) no longer possess greater physical abilities, citing "studies
336
in industrial and sports medicine" in support of this3.
However, as observed above
in note 330, the German studies apparently did not include any based solely on
firefighters. As Professor Dagmar Schiek has usefully observed, the Court approach
can be criticized as stereotyping, concluding that "older people will always become
incapable of performing physically demanding tasks,"3
instead of requiring that
individual assessments be used to determine a firefighter's physical capabilities.
Individual firefighters between the ages of forty and fifty may significantly differ in
their physical capabilities.
We turn now from firefighters to police officers. The Second Chamber's 2014
judgment in Vital Perez,3 3 9 the most recent relevant judgment, provides a useful
contrast to Wolf The judgment invalidated another age-based limitation on service: a
maximum thirty-year age limit for entry into membership in a local police force.
A 1986 Spanish Law set out the principal functions of "State security forces": the

musculature and endurance diminishes with age," but apparently did not provide specific studies concerning
firefighters.
331 Id. ¶
31.
332 Id. ¶
40.
3
33

Id.

¶¶

43-44. See also Op. Advoc. Gen., Wolf, , EU:C:2009:509,

Wolf, EU:C:2010:3,

¶ 43.

Id. ¶ 44. See also Op. Advoc. Gen., Wolf, EU:C:2009:509, ¶ 38.
Wolf, EU:C:2010:3, ¶ 41.
3 Schiek, supra note 19, at 793.
338
Id.
339 VitalPerez, EU:C:2014:2371.
3

336

¶¶ 25-35.
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assurance of public security, the protection of people and property, the prevention of
crime and the arrest of presumed criminals.340 The Spanish Law's Article 53(1)
defined the duties of local police forces to be to act as auxiliaries of the State security
341
forces3.
Spain's seventeen regions then adopted rules governing the membership and
operations of their local police. In a 2007 regional law, the Asturia region specified
the duties of its local police as "protecting persons and property, the arrest and custody
of offenders, conducting crime prevention patrols, traffic control," etc. 3 42 When Vital
Perez challenged Asturia's requirement that candidates for entry into its local police
forces must be no more than thirty years old,34 3 the Administrative Court asked the
Court of Justice whether the maximum age limit of thirty could be justified under
eitherArticle 4(1) or 6(1) of Directive 2000/78. Obviously, setting a maximum age for
recruitment into the local forces constituted direct discrimination based on age. 3
The Second Chamber initially examined whether the maximum age limit could
be considered to be based upon "a genuine and determining occupational
requirement," pursuant to the Directive's Article 4(1).345 The Court concluded that
some of the duties of local police (e.g., the arrest and custody of criminal offenders)
might require physical force, which would be an occupational requirement necessary
for "the operational capacity and proper functioning of the police service." 346
Nonetheless, observing that Article 4(1) must be strictly interpreted, because it is a
derogation from the principle of non-discrimination (citing Prigge),34 7 the Second
Chamber held that the Asturian maximum entry age limit could not be considered to
be essential to the execution of many tasks of the local police. The Court observed that
Asturia's stringent physical capacity tests in the recruitment process assured that a
candidate for recruitment would have the physical ability to carry out the local police
duties.34 8 The Court distinguished the role of local police from that of the firefighters
in Wolf, who required "exceptionally high physical capacities" for their principal
occupational role of firefighting.3 49 The Second Chamber also observed that Spain had
abolished its maximum age limit of thirty for entry into the national police force, and
that other regions had either no maximum age recruitment level, or set it at an age
350
between thirty-five and forty.
This obviously cast doubt on Asturia's requirement

340 Organic law on security forces and services art. 11(1) (B.O.E.
1986, 2); see Vital Perez,
EU:C:2014:2371, ¶ 13.
341 Organic law on security forces and services art. 53(1); see VitalPerez, EU:C:2014:2371,
¶ 14.
34 2
Id.¶ 10.
343 Id.
344 Id.

¶ 16.
¶¶ 32-33.

345 Council Directive 2000/78, supra note 4, art. 4(1).
346

VitalPerez, EU:C:2014:2371, ¶¶ 39-44.
¶ 47 (citing Prigge, EU:C:2011:573, ¶ 72).

347 Id.
34 8

Id.

349 Id.

¶ 55.
¶¶ 52-57.

See also Opinion of the Advocate General Mengozzi, Vital Perez v. Ayuntamiento de
Oviedo, Case C-416/13, EU:C:2014:2109, ¶¶ 13, 17-26. Advocate General Paolo Mengozzi reaches the
same conclusion but notes that although the Commission took the same view, Spain, France, Germany, and
Italy all supported Asturias in intervening briefs.
350 Vital Perez, EU:C:2014:2371, ¶¶ 50-51. Advocate General Mengozzi observed that the disparity
in regional rules not only cast doubt on the rules set by Asturias, but manifested the absence of the
consistency which the principle of proportionality requires for government rules intended to achieve the
operational capacity of the local police service. Op. Advoc. Gen., Vital Perez, EU:C:2014:2109, TT 62-64.
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that a candidate for recruitment be under thirty years old.
With regard to any possible justification of Asturia's rule pursuant to Article 6(1)
of the Directive, the Second Chamber held that no evidence indicated that the
maximum age limit would further the employment of younger candidates for
recruitment, or appropriate training. 35 In contrast to Wolf the Second Chamber
observed that there was no reason to require entry into the local police before the age
of thirty in order to ensure an adequate number of police below Asturia's mandatory
retirement age ofsixty-five.352 Overall, the Second Chamber's 2014 judgment in Vital
Perez can be appraised as sensibly and pragmatically applying Directive 2000/78's
Article 4(1). In contrast to Wolf the Second Chamber specifically observed that Article
4(1) should be strictly construed, citing Recital 23 and Prigge.35 3 In its judgment, the
Court concluded that Asturia's "stringent" individual physical assessment tests for
local police officers could satisfactorily determine an applicant's capacity, making a
mandatory maximum recruitment age unnecessary.
Why shouldn't firefighters'
continued service in their forties likewise be determined by individual physical
assessment tests, rather than a mandatory age limit?
It is worth noting that in Wolf, the Hessen court never referred to the Court of
Justice any question concerning Hessen's compulsory retirement of firefighters at
sixty. Inasmuch as Hessen indicated that its firefighters over forty-five provide only
management and other services, it is odd that they should be required to retire at sixty,
not sixty-five, inasmuch as some firefighters might want to undertake management
and other less physically-demanding service functions until sixty-five. In Fuchs and
Kohler, 35 the referring court indicated that Hessen's compulsory retirement age for
civil servants was sixty-five. Moreover, as we just observed, in Vital Perez the
retirement age for local police officers was sixty-five.
On a comparative note, somewhat complicated provisions of the 1986 ADEA
permit state and local governmental authorities to engage in age-based discrimination
in hiring and to compel mandatory retirement for firefighters and law enforcement
356
officers3. As amended in 1996, the rules forbid mandatory retirement before the age
of fifty-five, but generally permit it after that age.
Respect for proper protection
against age-based discrimination points to enabling individuals who want to continue
in service, and are physically and mentally capable of doing so, to be employed after
fifty-five. Fortunately, a 1996 amendment, Public Law 104-208, requires state and
local governments to afford firefighters and law enforcement officers aged fifty-five

Vital Perez, EU:C:2014:2371, ¶¶ 63, 70.
¶¶ 64-73. Advocate General Mengozzi observed that police officers recruited after thirty, but at
an age relatively close to thirty (like the plaintiff Vital Perez) would have "a normal professional career . .
able to serve for a reasonable period, even in the most demanding duties" before reaching the retirement
age. Op. Advoc. Gen., Vital Perez, EU:C:2014:2109, ¶ 59.
1 Vital Perez, EU:C:2014:2371, ¶¶ 46-47.
351

352 Id.

354

Id.

¶ 55.

Fuchs & Kohler, EU:C:2011:508.
Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, § 3-4, 100 Stat.
3342, 3324-43 (1986) (currently codified in 29 U.S.C. § 623(j)).
3 Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-23
(1996) (currently codified at 29 U.S.C. § 623(j)(1)(b)).
3
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or older an "annual opportunity to demonstrate physical and mental fitness" to carry
out their "public safety tasks."
Turning from the occupational requirements context, in Part III.B we reviewed
several Court judgments that held that a national rule constituted direct discrimination
in employment based on age with regard to a specific profession or field, but then
examined whether the rule could be considered justified under Directive 2000/78's
Article 6. The Second Chamber judgment in Georgiev359 accepted the compulsory
retirement of university professors at age sixty-five, on the basis of a key doctrinal
justification for such mandatory retirement, namely, the promotion of an inter360
generational mix among university professors.
Somewhat surprisingly, the ADEA formerly provided specific coverage for
university professors. The 1986 ADEA provided an exception authorizing the
compulsory retirement of university professors, "serving under a contract of unlimited
361
tenure," up to December 31, 19933.
However the 1986 ADEA legislative exception
required the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to contract with the
National Academy of Science (NAS) to carry out a study on "the potential
consequences of the elimination of mandatory retirement on institutions of higher
education." 362 The NAS study concluded that universities should cease to be
authorized to set a mandatory retirement age for tenured university professors,
predicting that few professors would opt to continue their academic career after
seventy, and that there would be no substantial adverse impact on younger professors.
363

Following the NAS study, Congress did not act to remove the termination date of
December 31, 1993 set in the ADEA exception. Accordingly, since that date tenured
university professors cannot be compelled to retire (except, of course, if they are
unable to satisfy a bona-fide occupational qualification), although universities are
permitted to provide benefits and other economic incentives to induce professors to
retire.3 64
Does the ADEA's abolition of compulsory retirement for tenured university
professors provide a basis for criticism of the Second Chamber judgment in Georgiev
(particularly the "inter-generational mix" justification)? The desirability of an "intergenerational mix" among university professors in the United States is obvious, yet that
concern did not prevent the abolition of compulsory retirement. Moreover, in the
United States, many universities have policies that motivate older professors to retire
through the grant of economic benefits. This approach appears to be quite satisfactory,
reducing the risk of blocking the hiring of a significant number of entry-level, young

119(2)(d)(2), 110 Stat. at 3009-25.
Georgiev, EU:C:2010:699.
360 See supra text accompanying notes 251-253.
361 Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-592, § 5, 100 Stat. 3342
(1986).
362 Id. §
6(c).
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academics. University administrations in the EU should consider adopting similar
policies.
In any event, as suggested in the critical review of Georgiev in Part IIIB, Member
States should consider raising any compulsory retirement age for university professors
to seventy, to benefit from their experience and competence, and in view of the
demographic factor of increasing longevity.
We turn now to a final comparative examination: that of compulsory retirement
of state and local civil service employees. Fuchs and Kohler 365 concerned a
compulsory retirement age of sixty-five for public prosecutors, but the issue in the
questions referred could analogously relate to Germany's compulsory retirement age
of sixty-seven for federal civil servants. Because Article 3(1) of Directive 2000/78
states expressly that its protective scope covers "both the public and the private
sectors," the two plaintiffs were able to challenge their compulsory retirement by a
German federal state. The Second Chamber concluded that the compulsory retirement
was justified, based upon its doctrine of an "inter-generational mix" and the
"promotion of access of young people." 3 66 The critical review of Fuchs and Kohler in
Part III.B above suggested that nonetheless, any compulsory retirement age for civil
servants should be moved back to seventy in view of the demographic impact of
greater longevity and in order to gain the value of the greater experience of the
relatively small number who might choose to work beyond sixty-five or sixty-seven.
In contrast, Section 5 of the 1978 ADEA amendment eliminated compulsory
367
retirement for federal employees, except in a few sensitive categories3.
Another
amendment of the ADEA in 1974 provided protective coverage for employees of state
and local governments against age-based discrimination, doing so simply by including
state and local governments within the definition of the term, "employer." 3 68
As previously noted, in 1983 the Supreme Court upheld Congress' extension of
the ADEA's protective coverage to state employees in EqualEmployment Opportunity
Commission v. Wyoming.369 Justice Brennan, speaking for a majority of five justices,
concluded that application of the ADEA to states, thus protecting state employees from
age-based discrimination, did not "directly impair" a state's ability to "structure
integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions," and accordingly
did not significantly limit state sovereignty in the federal system. 3 7 0 The precise issue
in the case was whether Wyoming could compel the retirement of a state employee, a
fish and game warden, at the age of fifty-five. Justice Brennen's opinion held
specifically that the ADEA prohibited "the discharge of employees based on their
365
366

Fuchs & Kohler, EU:C:2011:508.
Id. ¶¶ 7, 49.
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Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 5, 92 Stat.
189 (1978). Obviously, the ADEA does not apply to military personnel serving in the armed forces. Spain
v. Ball, 928 F. 2d. 61 (2d Cir. 1991).
368 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2016) (including state and local governments in the term "employer").
369 EEOC v. Wyoming, 460
U.S. 226 (1983).
370 Id. at 239. Chief Justice Burger's dissent for four Justices contended vigorously that application of
the ADEA could substantially increase states' employment costs and would have a serious adverse economic
impact. Id. at 255-58. Justice Brennen specifically rejected this argument, maintaining that it was not certain
whether the ADEA would have "either a direct or an obvious negative effect on state finances." Id. at 241.
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age,"3 7 1 and then held that Wyoming could only terminate an employee on the basis
of age after an individualized review pursuant to the ADEA's "bona fide occupational
372
qualification" (BFOQ) exception.
Although not challenging as such the ADEA's application to states on the basis of
EEOC v. Wyoming, in 2000 the Supreme Court in Kimel v. FloridaBoard ofRegents3 7 3
held that states as employers were shielded by sovereign immunity from liability in
civil damage actions, pursuant to language in the Fourteenth Amendment. Because
Justice 0' Connor's opinion for a majority of five justices dealt only with the civil
damage issue, it did not affect the power of the EEOC to take enforcement actions
occasioned by age-based discrimination claims of state employees, such as measures
for injunctive relief or conciliation proceedings.3 7 4 Moreover, subsequent decisions of
federal courts have held that cities and other local governmental authorities do not
enjoy the sovereign immunity of states and are accordingly fully subject to the ADEA's
prohibition of age-based discrimination with regard to their employees.
Arguably, Congress' elimination of age discrimination for federal, state, and local
government employees, upheld by the Supreme Court with regard to states, provides
support for the view that those EU Member States that require the compulsory
retirement of their civil service employees at a specific age (usually sixty-five or sixtyseven), should seriously consider raising that age to seventy, especially in
consideration of the progressive demographic impact of greater longevity.
One final exception to the ADEA should be mentioned. In 1978, when Congress
amended the 1967 ADEA to protect employees from age-based discrimination up to
the age of seventy, it added an exception enabling employers to retire persons
"employed in a bona fide executive or a high policymaking position" during the two376
year period preceding retirement3.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), which enforces the ADEA, has narrowly construed this text, limiting the
exception "only to a very few top level employees who exercise substantial executive
authority over a significant number of employees and a large volume of business."
Whether a large corporate entity could compel the retirement of a senior executive or
policy maker has not been presented to the Court of Justice to date, but if the issue
were to be included in a referring court's questions, the Court would certainly apply
its customary approach under Directive 2000/78's Article 6, and examine whether the
employer would have an objective and proportionate basis for requiring retirement.

371 Id. at 232.
372 Id. at 240.
"' Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000). Justice Stevens issued a strong dissent on behalf
of four Justices.
374 See EEOC v. Bd. of Regents, 288 F. 3d 296 ( th Cir. 2002); EEOC v. Bd. of Supervision, 559 F. 3d
7
270 ( 5th Cir. 2009).
1 See e.g. Evans v. City of Bishop, 238 F. 3d 586 ( 5th Cir. 2000); Williams v. Dallas Area Rapid
Transit, 242 F. 3d 315 ( 5th Cir. 2001); Woods v. Rondout Valley Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. Of Educ., 466 F. 3d
232 (2d Cir. 2006).
37 6
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 12(c)(1), 81 Stat.
602 (1967) (currently codified in U.S.C. § 63 1(b)).
17 EEOC Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1625.12 (2016). See Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F. 2d
724 (2d Cir. 1984) (chief labor counsel did not qualify).
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CONCLUSION
Although most Americans choose to retire voluntarily in their early sixties, or
when eligible for retirement benefits, it is not uncommon for some to continue their
usual employment or occupation, or commence a new one, in their late sixties,
seventies, or even eighties. This is viewed as quite normal and part of the modem
American lifestyle. When Congress amended the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act in 1986, it provided solid legal protection for such employment of older
individuals, and eliminated compulsory retirement at any age, with a few exceptions.
Accordingly, Americans are apt to be surprised to learn that employees in the European
Union do not enjoy parallel protection against compulsory retirement, even though the
EU Directive 2000/78 (effective in November 2003) forbid age-based discrimination
in employment. The principal goal of this Article has been to indicate why some
Member State governments authorize or endorse compulsory retirement ages, and why
the Court of Justice has not held that this violated Directive 2000/78.
In Part II.A-C, this Article examined the Court of Justice judgments in Palacios
de la Villa, Age ConcernEngland, Rosenbladtand Hornfeldtwith regard to the Court's
conclusion that State measures authorizing or endorsing compulsory retirement ages
could be considered compatible with the Directive. The Court had two motives for this
conclusion. The first motive was the Court's acceptance that the States that set or
endorsed compulsory retirement ages are appropriately impelled to do so in order to
achieve the policy goal of an inter-generational balance in employment, especially for
younger workers who are often subject to high unemployment rates.m The second
motive was the traditional deference manifested by the Court to Member State
governments' political decisions in the highly sensitive field of employment policy.
The goal of achieving an inter-generational balance between the interests of younger,
mid-career, and older workers, constituted a valid motive for national compulsory
retirement ages. With regard to the Court's decidedly high level of judicial deference
toward the governmental policies, although pragmatically prudent in the sensitive
sectors of social and employment policy, such deference could create a risk that the
Court would too easily accept generalizations or stereotypes without adequately
probing into the basis for the policy. In any event, it is clear that the Court is unlikely
to challenge Member State rules adopted by an appropriate political process.
Part II.D presented the evolution in the ADEA with regard to compulsory
retirement, from the 1965 initial text that permitted employers to discharge (or retire)
employees at age sixty-five, through the 1978 amendment that delayed compulsory
retirement to age seventy, and then to the 1986 amendment, which eliminated any
compulsory retirement, with few exceptions. Although this presentation showed a
radical contrast with the rules of EU Member States, and the deferential judgments of
Court of Justice, the text concluded that the substantially different legal, social and
economic circumstances in the United States and the EU justified the different policy
approaches.
Part II.E discussed the impact of the progressive growth in longevity, which will
gradually produce a significant decrease in the working versus the non-working

See supra text accompanying notes 69, and 128-130.
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population in the EU. In view of this on-going development, it was suggested that
European States should seriously consider raising any compulsory retirement age to
seventy, as the United States did in the 1978 amendment to the ADEA. Relatively few
employees are apt to continue working up to the age of seventy. The impact on
governmental budgets may actually be positive, due to tax collection from those
continuing in employment, while their number is unlikely to be so large as to
significantly increase the unemployment of younger workers.
The Article's Part III examined seven Court judgments concerning compulsory
retirement ages, or limits on service, in specific professions or fields of employment.
Part III.A introduced a novel topic: Directive 2000/78's acceptance, in Article 4, of
age-based discrimination in particular occupations when it is due to "a genuine and
determining occupational requirement." The Court's 2011 judgment in Prigge
presented an excellent illustration. The Court invalidated Lufthansa's compulsory
retirement of commercial air pilots at age sixty, holding that Lufthansa's retirement
age could not be considered to be based on Article 4(1) in view of Germany's
acceptance of international rules on age transport that permitted pilots to continue
employment in multi-pilot crews until sixty-five.
In the four Court judgments reviewed in Part III.B, the issue was whether a clear
instance of age-based discrimination could be considered justified pursuant to Article
6 of Directive 2000/78. For American academics and students, Georgiev is the most
consequential judgment. In Georgiev, the Court replied to the questions referred and
upheld the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five for a university professor, based
upon the policy justification of the desire to achieve an inter-generational balance
within the academic profession. Subsequently, in Fuchs andKohlerthe Court accepted
the same inter-generational balance policy justification for a retirement age of sixtyfive for prosecutors, and implicitly for all government civil servants. The critical
review in Part III.B accepted the validity of the inter-generational balance policy, but
questioned whether setting the maximum service age at sixty-five failed to recognize
the high value provided by the professional experience and natural authority of older
academics, prosecutors, and other civil servants. A plausible argument can be made
for retarding the retirement age to seventy.
Commission v. Hungary requires little comment in this conclusion. The Grand
Chamber easily concluded that the authoritarian Hungarian government of Prime
Minister Orban was unjustified in its sudden reduction of the retirement age ofjudges,
prosecutors and notaries from seventy to sixty-two. Clearly the reduction was too
abrupt, and failed to enable the individuals affected to take appropriate action to
protect their economic interests. What is unfortunate is the Grand Chamber's failure
to criticize the earlier retirement as prejudicial to judicial independence.
Finally, Part III.C presented a series of interesting contrasts with U.S. legislation
and court judgements under specific exceptions to the 1986 ADEA's overall
elimination of a compulsory retirement age. Perhaps the most striking one is with
regard to university professors. The 1986 ADEA initially created an exception that
permitted compulsory retirement of tenured university professors until 1993, but
subject to an authoritative review by the National Academy of Science. Fortunately
for U.S. academics (and the present author), the NAS study concluded that mandatory
retirement for university professors should be eliminated, a happy note upon which to
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